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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah

JAMES C. WHITTAKER,
-vs.-

P!Jamtitt,

RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose
name RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as
Administrator has been substituted,
JOHN EDISON SPENCER, ELIZABETH A. TIBBS, VORD SPENCER,
IRWIN M. PRICE, SIMON RUGENTOBLER, (in whose place Que Jensen
has been substituted, INDIANOLA
IRRIGATION COMPANY and •the
STAT~~ OF UTAH,
Defendam.ts.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was commenced on July 21st, 1941 by
the plaintiff to quiet his claim to 60 acres or shares of
primary or class ''A'' water in Thistle Creek and its
tributaries. These creeks rise in •the northern end of
Sanpete County and when not diverted for irrigation
flow northerly into Spainsh Fork River and thence into
Utah Lake.
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Simon Hugentobler was made a party defendant
because he held a mortgage on a tract of land owned by
Richard Spencer, together with 55 shares or acres of
primary class "A" water right in Thistle Creek and
its tributaries.
Prior to the trail of this cause Simon Hugentobler
conveyed his interest in the water of Thistle Creek and
its tributaries to Que ,Jensen who was subsituted for
Simon Hugentobler.
Prior to the trial of the cause Richard H. Spencer
died and Richard Leo Spencer, having been appointed
administrator of the estate of his father Richard H.
Spencer was substituted as a defendant for his deceased father.
J. Vord Spencer, a son of Richard H. Spencer, did
not claim any interest in the controversy, except as an
heir of Richard H. Spencer, deceased.
The Indianola Irrigation Company is a mutual
irrigation company and as such distributes the waters
of Thistle Creek and its tributaries to its stockholders
who own land adjacent to said creek.
By his pleadings Richard Leo Spencer claimed all
of the waters in controversy but during the course of
the trail it was agreed by his counsel that Que Jensen,
as successor in interest of Simon Hugentobler, was
entitled to 55 acres or shares of the waters in question.
By his pleadings defendant, Irwin M. Price claimed
to be the owner of 160 shares of the water in dispute,
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but during the course of the trail he disclaimed any
right to such stocks.
By his pleadings defendant John Edison Spencer
claimed to be the owner of the water in controversy, but
that eighty shares of the water was to be conveyed ,to
his sister Elizabeth A. Tibbs, when and if he established
a right thereto. During the course of the trial counsel
for defendants, John Edi'son Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs, conceded tha1t Que Jensen, as the successor of
Simon Hugentobler, was entitled to 55 shares or acres
of the water right in controversy.
Elizabeth A. Tibbs claims the right to 80 shares of
the water in controversy because of an agreement had
between John Edison Spencer, Irwin M. Price and her
father, Richard H. Spencer, and because her father
Richard H. Spencer, by a warranty deed conveyed to
her 80 acres of land to which she claims 80 shares or
acres of the water in dispute is appurtenant.
In order that the court may more readily understand what appellants, John Edison Spencer and
Elizabeth A. Tibbs, claim for the evidence, which we
shall presently summarize, we at ithe outset claim:
That the plaintiff,· James C. Whittaker, does
not have any title to the 60 shares of water right to
which he seeks to quiet title because:
1.

(a) The mortgage under which he claims title was
and is void for uncertainty as to any sixty acres or
shares of water:
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(h) The decree of foreclosure of the mortgage
under which he claims title is void for uncertainty:
(c) The sheriff's deed which was issued pursuant
to the decree of foreclosure is void for uncertainty in
so far as it affects the 60 shares or acres of water
right:
(d) The deed to the plaintiff from the grantee in
the sheriff's deed to the 60 shares or acres of water
right claimed by the plaintiff is void for uncertainty.
2. That the water right in controversy, other than
the 55 shares to which Que Jensen is entitled, is appurtenant to land which Richard H. Spencer, during his
lifetime, conveyed to John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs and as such SO shares or acres belongs
to Elizabeth A. Tibbs and the remainder to John Edison
Spencer.
3. That even if the water right is not appurtenant to the land conveyed to Elizabeth A. Tibbs and John
Edison Spencer, they own the right to such waters by
!'Ieason of the delivery of the stock certificate to John
Edison 8pencer.
The record in this case is somewhat lengthy. Much
of the evidence is not in conflict. We shall direct the
attention of the court to those portions of the evidence
that we deem necessary to an understanding of the
matters which divide the parties to this litigation.
On June 21st, 1918 the persons who claimed a
water right in Thistle Creek and i•ts tributaries ex-
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ecuted Articles of Incoryoration of the Indianola Irrigation Company. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 7). By
such articles it was provided among other things:

''ARTICLE 5
The capital stock of this corporation shall
be $80,000. Eighty Thousand Dollars divided
into Twenty Two Hundred shares, as follows:
Eighteen Hundred shares of class "A" stock, of
the par value of Forty Dollars per share, and
Four Hundred shares of class "B" stock of the
par value of Twenty Dollars per share.''

"ARTICLE 6
The purpose for which this corporation is
formed, and the pursuits and business to be
engaged in, is to manage, regulate, control and
distribute the wwters of Thistle Creek, its branches and tributaries in Sanpete County, to which
it shall be entitled, to and among its stockholders
in proportion to their and each of their respective rights to the use thereof, to construct
and maintain all such dams, ditches, canals, gates,
reservoirs, flumes and other and different structures and means which may be found necessary
or convenient for the domestic and other purposes.''
"ARTICLE 18
.Subscription to the capital stock of this corporation, by •the persons above named, are made
by each of such persons conveying to this corporation by good and sufficient deed one acre
of primary water rights from the waters of
Thistle Creek, its branches and tributaries, for
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every share of class ''A'' stock, subscribed for
by him, which said water right is taken and received by this corporation at the price and vaulation of Forty Dollars per acre of such primary
water rights as fully paid up subscription for
such stock. And one acre of secondary water
right from the above mentioned sources for every
share of class '' B'' stock subscribed for by him,
which said water rights are taken and received
by •this corporation at the price and valuation of
Twenty Dollars per acre of such secondary water
rights as fully paid up subcription for such stock,
and future subscriptions to any capital stock
of this corporation shall be made only upon the
above terms. And the Board of Directors shall
in all cases determine the sufficiency of waterrights to be received by the corporation for subscriptions for its stock. The waters hereinbefore referred to, include the waters from Thistle,
Rock and Clear Creeks, their branch~s and tributaries.''
1

"ARTICLE 19
The Board of Directors shall cause the
waters owned by this corporation to be distributed and divided to and among its stockholders,
at the rate and in the proportion of stock held by
each person, in the following manner, to wit:
from and after the first day of March, to and
including the 15th day of June each and every
year, all the waters owned by this corporation,
shaH be divided among, and distributed to the
stockholders of this corporation, both to class
A and class B equally, pro-rate, and in
proportion to the amount of stock held by each
person. From and aHer the 1'5th day of June, to
and including the first day of March, following,
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during each and every year, the owners of class
A stock of this corporation, shall be entitled,
as a first right, to an amount of water equal
to 1/40 of a second foot of water for every share
of class A stock of this corporation, held by
him, or if there shall not be sufficient water,
owned by this corporation, to fully supply said
amount, then such water as may be available,
shall be divided and distributed to the holders
of said class A stock, pro-rate and in the
proporation to the amount of said class A stock
held by each person. And if, after all of class
A stock, shall first have been fully supplied
with 'the amount of water above stated, there
shall at anytime be a surplus of water, over and
above what will fully supply all of class A
stock, as above stated, then such surplus water
shall be divided among and distributed to the
holders of class B stock, pro-rate and in proporation to the amount of said class B stock
held by each person.''
On May 6th, 1920 a decree was entered in the district court of Sanpete County in an action entitled:
''Indianola Irrigation Company, a corporation, et al.,
plaintiffs, vs. R. H. Spencer, et al., defendants." In
such decree it was, among other things, adjudged:

"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that for the purposes of effecting a proper
and economical method of distributing the waters
of the aforesaid streams through said Indianola
Irrigation Company said stream shall be divided
into 1800 shares of class "A" stock, and 500
shares of class '' B'' stock and said stock shall
be divided between the parties hereto including
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the stockholders of the Indianola Irrigation Company, as follows:"
Then follows a list of persons who are decreed
water rights to 1the total number of 1728 shares of class
"A" water right. R. H. Spencer, who is the same person as Richard H. Spencer, is awarded 448 shares of
class "A" stock. (See plaintiff's Exhibit" A".)
On ~~-U.~~y,_23~,..,!9_22 defendant R. H. Spencer and
his wife, Annie H. Spencer, executed a mortgage to
Simon Hugentobler on Lot 4 of Section 5 and Lot 1
of Section 6, in Township 12 South, Range 4 Eas't, Salt
Lake Meridian, consisting of 77 acres, together with
55 shares of primary water right from 'the waters of
Thistle Creek to secure the payment of a note for
$2577.91. That mortgage was recorded on January 12,
192?. in Sanpete County, Utah. (See Trs. pages 26 to 28).
On November 9th, 1926 Richard H. Spencer, who is
the same person as R. H. Spencer, and J. Vord Spencer,
Josie Spencer, his wife, H. M. Spencer and his wife
Ida Spencer gave a mortgage to the Federal Building
and Loan Association, a corporation, together with
Two Hundred eighty-five ('285) shares of capital stock
of the Indianola Irrigation Company, a corporation,
also all water and waler right appurtaining to or used
upon or in connection with the real estate described in

the mortgage. The land described in the mortgage is in
Sanpete County, Utah and particularly described as
follows:
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Beginning 7.61 chains South from the North
East Corner of the South East Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt '
Lake Meridian, thence South 89 degrees West
18.79 chains; thence North 7.88 chains; thence
West 21.21 chains ; thence South 20.00 chains;
thence East 40 chains ; thence North 12.39 chains
to the place of beginning, containing 59.46 acres,
more or less.
Also:
Beginning at a point 3.89 chains South from
the Southeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter
of Section 5, Township 12 South of Range 4.
East, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah: thence West
1 degree South 18.79 chains ; thence South 3.72
chains; thence East 1 degree North 18.79 chains;
thence North 3.72 chains to beginning, containing
7 acres, more or less.

~.

Also:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of the
North East quarter of Section 5, in Township
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
Utah, thence running West 3.50 chains, thence
North 2.17 chains; thence West 15.29 chains ;
thence South 1.72 chains, thence East 4.44 chains,
thence South 25° East 3.60 chains; thence South
60° 45' West 1.50 chains ; thence West 4.65 chains,
thence South 0.34 of a chain; thence North 89°
East 18.79 chains; thence North 3.89 ~hains to
beginning, containing 7.54 acres, more or less.
Also:
The Southeast quarter of Section 8 in
Township 12 South of Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, ,Utah.
The land and water right above described were
given to secure a note for $14,266.50. That mortgage

l •
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was recorded in Sanpete County, Utah on November
9, 1926. (See Trs. 29 to 35).
At the time R. H. Spencer executed the mortgage
above mentioned he also executed and delivered to the
Federal Building and Loan Association a written mstrument which is in words and figures as follows:
''ASSIGNMENT
'' F'or value received I have bargained, sold,
assigned and transferred and by these presents
do bargain, sell, assign and transfer to the Federal Building and Loan Association, a Utah corporation, with its principal place of business in
Ogden, Utah, all of my right, title and interest
in and to Two Hundred Twenty Three (223)
shares of class "A" stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company in the State of Utah with its
principal place of business at Indianola, Sanpete County, State of Utah, and I further assign
to said Federal Building and Loan Association
any additional interest in sa:id stock that may
accrue to me in said stock, which at this ,time is
unissued and should the same be issued I direct
that it be issued to the Federal Building and
Loan Association, and I hereby constitute and
appoint the Federal Building and Loan Association my true and lawful attorney irrevocably for
me instead to transfer said stock on the books
of said company with full power of substitution
and irrevocation.
Dated this 9th day of November, 1926.
-Witness.
David Wilson /s/"
/s/ R. H. Spencer
(See Irrigation Co. Exhibit 1.)
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The other 62 shares of the 285 shares or acres of
water mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan
Association belonged to H. M. Spencer and Elizabeth
'l'ibbs. (~'r. 342 to 405.)
On May 21, 1931 R H. Spencer and his wife Annie
H. Spencer conveyed to the defendant FJlizabeth A. Tibbs:
''The NI!J % of the NW% of Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 40 acres more or less.
Together with twenty acres of primary water
right from Clear Creek, Rock Creek and Thistle
Creek.''
That deed was recorded on May 21, 1931. ( Tr.
35-36)
On October 16th, 1931 Henry M. Spencer, other-wise known as H. M. Spencer, Ida Spencer, his wife,
Leo Harold Spencer and Fern Spencer, his wife, R. H.
Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, mortgaged
to W. H. Hadlock, State Bank Commissioner of Utah
the West -Halt' of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast
Quarter of the Northwest quarter and the North Half
of the South Half of Section 'l'hree (3), Township 12
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containing 280 acres, subject to right of way of county
road.
"Together with all right of every kind and
nature, however evidenced to the use of water,
ditches and canals for the irrigation of sa'id

.
1
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premises to which the mortgagors or said premises are now or may hereafter become entitled,
whether represented by certificates of s'tock or
otherwise and together with sixty (60) shares or
acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer in
the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and
Rock Creeks in addition to water now used for
the irrigation of the above described lands.''
That mortgage was given to secure a number of
notes, one for $2440.00, one ior$4750.00, one for $1500.00;
one for $500.00; one for $1400.00; one for $1'50.00 and
one for $5000.00.
That mortgage was recorded on October 21, 1931.
(Tr. 37 to 41).
By an instrument dated June 21, 1918 a number
of persons executed what purports to be a Deed of
Water Rights whereby they purported to convey to the
Indianola Irrigation Company certain water rights. The
conveyance recites that in consideration of certificates
oi the capital stock of the Indianola Irrigation Company
the signers grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and
quit claim to the Indianola Irrigation Company all of
their rights, titles, interest, claims and demands in and
to the waters of Thistle, Rock and Clear Creeks and
their tributaries the respective amounts and classes
which are set opposite their names, together with aN
ditches, canals, dams, gates, and all other appurtenances
heretofore used in the controlling and distribution of
said water in accordance with the terms and conditions
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contained in the articles of incorporation of the Indianola
Irrigation Company.
Among the signers of 1the conveyance were Richard
H. Spencer and his wife Annie Spencer. Through the
words : ''dated this 25th day of November, 1931,'' there
is drawn in red ink a line. Under the name of Richard
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer the words "One Hundred and Sixty shares class A stock.''
The paper on which the names of Richard H.
Spencer and Annie Spencer appear is attached to the
conveyance. The acknowledgement was taken on June
1st, 1918, before H. F. Wall and shows that R. H.
Spencer and Annie Spencer acknowledged the instrument on that day. (See Indianola Irrigation Co. Exhibit
5) That conveyance was read into the record and will
be found at pages 43 to 49 of the transcript.
1

On October 29, 1933 Richard H. Spencer and Annie
H. Spencer, his wife, conveyed to the defendant John
E. Spencer the South one-half of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of water in what
is known as Thistle Creek. That deed was recorded on
June 22, 1933. (See page 51 and 52 of Trs.) On September 16, 1933 a deed was given to correct the description in the deed above referred to in which later
deed the land conveyed is described as the North One
Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 5, Township
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, containing
80.00 acres. Together with 80 acres of water in what is
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known as Thistle Creek. That deed was recorded on
September 21, 1933. (Tr. 2 to 54). The last mentioned
deed was offered and received in evidence as '' .T ohn
Edison Spencer et al., Exhibit 12. ''
Plaintiff offered and over objection of defendants
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, there was
received in evidence certain of the files in case numbered
2888 and in which John A. Malia, as State Bank Com"
missioner, is plaintiff and Richard H. Spencer, John
Edison Spencer, Robert D. Tibbs, Elizabeth A. Tibbs
and others are defendants. Later in the proceedings
all of {he files in that case were received in evidence.
(Tr. 73 to 80 and 576-583)
The files in 2888 civil contain the proceedings had
m the mortgage foreclosure proceedings by the Bank
Commissioner through which foreclosure proceedings
the plaintiff in this case, as we understand his pm;ition,
claims his title to 60 acres or shares of water. We
shall not attempt to set out the various documents
found in that case but shall content ourselves with
referring to such of such documents as we deem material
to this case. The files are marked: ''John Edison
Spencer 1£xhibit 14," but most of the documents therein
contained were first offered by the plaintiff and over
objections received in evidence as above indicated.

It will be seen from the files in said case numbered
2888 civil that the action was first brought to set aside
certain deeds. After issues were made by the complaint
and answers thereto an amended complaint was filed
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m which numerous additional parties were made defendants and the plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on both real and personal property.
In our view the only part of the proceedings had
m that case which are material here are those portion
thereof which relates to the foreclosure of ~the mortgage
executed by H. M. Spencer, Ida Spencer, R. Leo Spencer,
Grace Spencer, R. H. Spencer, Leo Harold Spencer and
Fern Spencer. A copy of that mortgage will he found
marked Exhibit "G" and made a part of the amended
complaint. As heretofore indicated that mortgage covers
the West Half of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast
Quarter of the the Northwest Quarter and the North
Half of the South Half of Section r:el1I'ee (3), Township
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containing 280 acres, subject to right of way of county
road.
rrogether with all rights of every kincl and nature,
however evidenced to the use of water, ditches and
canals for the irrigation of said premises to which the
mortgagors or said premises are now or may hereafter
become entitled whether repr~sented by certificates of
stock or otherwise and together with sixty shares or
acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer in the
waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock
Creek in addition to waters now used for the irrigation
of the above described lands.
rt'o the complaint of the Bank Commissioner
Richard H. Spencer, Annie H. Spencer, John Edison
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Spencer, Elizabeth A. Tibbs, et al, filed a general demurrer and an answer. In the answer they denied most
of the allegations of the complaint.
To the complaint filed by John A. Malia, as Bank
Commissioner, the Indianola Irrigation Company filed
an answer and cross complaint. In its answer it admitted most of the allegations of the complaint and in its
cross complaint it sought to enjoin the transfer of the
certificates of stock held by the other parties to the aetion.
Simon Hugentobler also filed an answer, counterclaim and cross complaint in the action. In his counterclaim and cross complaint he sought to foreclose a
mortgage given to him on January 3, 1922 by Richard Leo
Spencer, Grace Spencer, R. H. Spencer and Annie H.
Spencer as security for a nate in the sum of $2,577.91.
The mortgage which he sought to foreclose was on Lot 4
of Section 5 and Lot 1 of Section 6 in Township 12 South,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian and 55 acres of
Primary Water Right from the waters of Th'istle Creek.
There are numerous other pleadings in cause 2888
civH but no useful purpose will be served by directing
the attention of the court thereto in this proceeding.
It appears from the recitals preceding the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law that a trail was had
before the court sitting without a jury. That the plaintiff and defendants Richard H. Spencer, Annie Spencer,
cross complainants Simon Hugentobler and Indianola
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Irrigation Company were represented by counsel; that
John Edison Spencer was present in court but not
represented by counsel and that the other parties to the
action had been given notice of the time set for the
trail.
The findings of fact are in the usual form in a
mortgage forec;losure. In paragraph 12 on page 5 of
the findings the court finds that the mortgage to the
Bank Commissioner was executed. In its findings numbered 21, 22, 23, 24, 2'5 and 26 the court found:
21
''That the Indianola Irrigation Company, a
corporation claims to be the owner of the water
rights described in plaintiff's mortgage by virtue
of a deed of conveyance executed and delivered to
said company the 25 day of November, 1931, by the
defendants Richard H. Spencer and Annie H.
Spencer, his wife. That on said 25 day of N ovember, 1931, the said defendants Richard H. Spencer
and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, executed and
delivered to said Irrigation Company a deed
conveying and transferring to said company 160
shares of decreed water rights then owned by the
said Richard H. Spencer in the waters of Clear
Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock Creek. That said
160 shares of decreed water rights included the
60 shares of water rights described in plaintiff's
mortgage hereinabove referred to, which mortgage was executed and delivered the 16th day of
October, 1931. ''
22
''That said Indianola Irrigation Company
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accepted conveyance of said water rights subsequent to the recordation of plaintiff's mortgage which was recorded upon the records of
Sanpete County, Utah, the 21 day of October,
1931, and said Irrigation Company is charged
with notice of plaintiff's mortgage. That the
rights acquired by the said Irrigation Company
by virtue of said conveyance from Richard H.
Spencer and wife are subsequent, subject, subordinate and inferior to the rights of the plaintiff
under the plaintiff's mortgage hereinabove mentioned.''
1

23
"That on said 25 day of November, 1931,
the said Richard H. Spencer received from said
Irrigation Company in exchange for the conveyance aforesaid, certificate of stock No. 57
of said company for 160 shares of class ''A''
stock of said Irrigation Company, which certificate was issued in ~the name of State of Utah
as pledges of R. H. Spencer. That said defendant
Richard H. Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, at
the said time and place represented and warranted to the officers of said Irrigation Company that the 160 shares of water deeded to said
company on said day were free and clear of all
encumbrances and that the title of said defendant
Richard H. Spencer thereto was good and valid
and that said defendant Richard H. Spencer
was entitled to said 160 shares of corporate stock
in said corporation; that said irrigation company
then and there relied upon said statements and
representations of said defendant and in reliance upon said statements and representations
the said company issued its stock certificate No.
57 aforesaid.''
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24
"That on or about the 30 day of December,
H)33, the defendant Richard H. Spencer surrendered and endorsed to said Indianola Irrigation Company the said certificate of stock No.
57 above mentioned, and upon this request and
representation that he was the owner of the
stock and water r'ights represented thereby there
was issued to and received by him two certificates in exchange therefor, to-wit: Certificate
No. 72 for eighty shares issued in the name of
''The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley as agent
of the Land Bank Commissioner, pledgee of
John E. Spencer." That said certificates Nos.
72 and 73 are now outstanding and are now in
possession of the defendant Richard U.-"Spencer.,-,-·- ·-
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"That the defendants Richard H. Spencer
and John Edison Spencer, claim, by virtue of said
stock certificates No. 72 and 73 aforesaid, and
otherwise, to be the owners of the water rights
represented by the said certificates. That said
claims are in each case subsequent, subject, subordinate, and inferior to the rights of the plaintiff under his mortgage as aforesaid.''
26

"That said defendants Richard H. Spencer
and John Edison Spencer will probably attempt
to transfer the said shares of stock represented
by said certificates herein referred to unless
restrained by the court and in case of such transfer the said Indianola Irrigation Company Will
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probably suffer irreparable injury for which said
company has no adequate remedy at law.''
In its findings the court also found that the mortgage to Simon Hugentobler had been executed.
In 'its conclusions of law the court ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Bank Commissioner, and
Simon Hugentobler.
As one of its seventeen conclusions the trail court
in said cause No. 2888 civil says:

''"" * "" and that plaintiff has a valid and subsisting first mortgage lien, as against each and all of
the other parties to this action, upon an of the
real estate and water rights described in plaintiff's real estate mortgage hereinabove referred
to, to secure payment of all the respective amounts
owing upon said notes as above set forth, including interest and attorney fees and costs of
this action.''
"That whatever rights, if any, the defendants
and cross complainants herein may assert in,
to or upon the real estate and water rights described in plaintiff's real estate mortgage aforesaid, such rights and claims are in the case of
each and every defendant and cross complainant
subsequent, subordinate, inferior and subject to
the lien of plaintiff's mortgage."
In its Decree of Foreclosure the court among other
things determined, ordered, adjudged and decreed: That
plaintiff's mortgage be enforced and foreclosed and the
real estate and water rights described therein and that
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the mortgage of Simon Hugentobler be foredosed and
sold to satisfy the judgment in favor of Hugentobler.
Paragraph 14 of the decree of foreclosure reads
thus:
''That the defendants Richard H. Spencer,
Annie H. Spencer, John Edison Spencer, Robert
D. Tibbs and Elizabeth A. Tibbs be and are hereby restrained and enjoined from in any way assigning, transferring, disposing of or encumbering certificates of stock No. 72 and No. 73, issued by the Indianola Irriga;tion Company, or
the water rights represented by said certificates,
or any other water rights held or claimed by said
defendants in the waters of Thistle Creek, Clear
Creek 'or Rock Creek until the further order of
this court. The Court hereby reta'ins jurisdiction
_,,, ..
of this cause for further hearing upon the rights 1/''
asserted by the Indianola Irrigation Company ~t
against said defendants.''
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree
were s'igned on December 3, 1936 and filed the following
day.
On the same day that the decree of foreclosure was
filed the sheriff published notice of sale. Such notice
describes the land covered by the mortgage and water
in the exact language of the mortgage.
So also in the sheriff's return and the order of sale

the real and personal property is described in the
exact language of the mortgage made to the Bank Commissioner. (Note the files in 2888 civil being made as
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exhibits are not numbered consecutively but the papers
therein are arranged in the order in which they were
filed).
The Bank Commissioner's deed to the plaintiff,
James C. Whittaker, describes the wa!ter right claimed
by him in the following language:
"The right to the use of 60 acres of primary
water right, being 60 acres or shares of class
"A" right, .from Thistle Creek and its tributaries in Sanpete County, State of Utah 'to be
used for irrigation, culinary and stock watering
purposes, during the irrigation season from April
1st to October 1st of each year upon lands in
Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian, being 'the same 60 acres of primary or
60 shares of class "A'.' water right of the 448
acres or shares of primary or class "A" water
right decreed to Richard H. Spencer by the
decree of the district court in and for Sanpete
County, State of Utah in case No. 1406." See
r_t'r. 97.
The proceedings had in the mortgage foreclosure
of the State Bank Commissioner against the Spencers
will also be found in an abstract which was received
in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "M ".
The mortgage given by the Spencers to the Federal
Building and Loan Association on the land and water
right heretofore mentioned was foreclosed. At the foreclosure proceedings the Association bought in the mortgaged property. Thereafter the Associa:tion conveyed
the water right to the Indianola Irrigation Company.
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(See Indianola Irr. Co. Exhibit 2) It received two certificates of stock the same being represented by certificate of stock No. 84 for 125 shares of class "A"
stock which was received in evidence as Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 20A. It will be noted that
the certificate was assigned to Richarcl H. Bpencer.
The remainder of the 285 shares acquired by the
Federal Building and Loan Association is numbered 86
of the Indianola Irrigation Company for 160 shares of
class ''A'' water stock issued to the Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley as pledgee of Robert D. Tibbs. That
exhibit was received in evidence as Exhibit 11. That is
the 160 shares of stock that was awarded to the appellant
John Edison Spencer.
The lancl that was foreclosed by the Federa!l Building and Loan As~·;ociation was also reconveyed to Richard
H. Spencer. (Tr. 884, 887 and 889).
Under date of August 7, 1945 R. H. Spencer executed a deed to the Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Township 12 South, Range 4 "BJaS't, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres. (See John Edison Spencer's l'Jxhibit 5.)
This is a part of the property that was mortgaged to and
foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association.
On the same day R. H. Spencer executed a warranty ideed
to Elizabeth A. Tibbs to the Southwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40 acres,
more or less. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 7.)
This too is a part of the property mortgagBd to and
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foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association.
Theretofore R. H. Spencer had executed a deed to
Elizabeth A. Tibbs conveying the Southeast Qua.rter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South,
Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (See
John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 8.)
On Aut,'llst 7, 1945, R. H. Spencer also executed a
deed 'to 53.78 acres of land in said Section, township and
range. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 6.)
This tract of land is a lso a part of the land mortgaged to and foreclosed by the Federal Building and
Loan As::,;ociation.
1

The deeds from H. H. Spencer, sometimes known as
Richard H. Spencer, which were executed on August 7,
1945 before C. H. Beal, an abstractor of Manti were delivered to the grantees on May 31, 1946. (See testimony
of R. D. Tibbs, Louise Spencer and C. H. Beal. Tr. 819
to 878.)
The wa-ter represented by all of the certificates of
stock have at all times been used on the Hugentobler land
and the land which Richard H. Spencer conveyed to
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs. (See testimony of Lyman Seeley. Tr. 360 to 365 and testimony of
John Edison Spencer, Tr. 502 to 511, and Tr. 6DO to 635.)
There is no evidence to the contrary.
The court may be aided in following the evidence
as to the ~and upon which 1the water in question was at
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all times used by referring to Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 29.
The triai court awarded to appellant John Edison
Spencer 3 acres of water for which no certificate had
been issued as being appurtenant to the land conveyed
to John Edison Spencer by R. H. Spencer, also known
as Richard H. Spencer, under date of August 7, 1945.
(See Tr. 584 to 586.) So far as appears no certificate was
ever issued for the water that was used on the land
covered by the mortgage to SJ.mon Hugentobler unless it
was represented by certificate 84 for 12'5 shares of water.
We have thus far at some length directed the attention of the court to transactions had touching the title
to the land upon which the water in dispute was used a!t
all times prior to the death of Richard H. Spencer and
up to the time of the trial of this cause. We have done so
because, as we contend, the water right was at aH times
appurtenant to the land upon which the water was used
notwithstanding the water right may have been represented by certificate of stock In this connection an examination of the testimony will reveal that at all times
prior to the time R. H. Spencer delivered the deeds to
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs the certificates of stock and the land upon which the water was
used were owned by the same person.
In the event the court should conclude that the water
in dispute is appurtenant :to the land upon which it was
used that would probably end this controversy, except
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possibly as to the 60 acres or shares claimed by the
pla'intiff.
If the court shourld not so conclude it will probably
be necessary to look into the evidence touching the various transfers of the stock certificates.
Certificate numbered 86 for the 160 shares of water
is marked .John FJdison Spencer's, et al, BJxhihit 11 and
as such was received in evidence. It is made out to The
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley as pledgee of R:obert
D. Tibbs. On the back of that certificate is a release
of a lien by the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, pledgee.
'l'hat certifieate comes out of the certificate for 285
shares evidenced by certificate 81 issued to the Federal
Building and Loan Association. (See photostatic copy
of the exhibit of Indianola Irrigation Co.) The number
of the exhibit does not appear on the same. That
certificate was surrendered and certificates number 84
and 8G issued in lieu 'thereof. Certificate 86 is for the
160 Class "A" stock which is marked: ".John Edison
Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 11.) Certificate 84 is for 125
shares Class ''A'' stock and is marked ''Indianola Irrigation Company's IDxhibit 20A". Certificate numbered
86 for 160 shares was acquired by .John Edison Spencer
assuming and paying the obligation owing upon the certifieate and the land u!pon which it was used to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley.

(See evidence of .John

Edison Spencer beginning at page 476 to 489 of the
'

j

;:
!

transcript and John I<Jdison Spencer's Jjjxhibits 3, 4, 4a.)
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As to certificate 84 for 125 shares, marked Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 20A, the evidence is
that it was part of the water right mortgaged to {he Federal Building and Loan Association; that after the mortgage was foreclosed the Federal Building and Loan Association conveyed all of the water right it acquired to
the Indianola Irrigation Company and received in return therefor a certificate of stock for 285 shares of
which 223 acres or shares were the waters owned by
R. H. Spencer and the balance of 62 or 62% acres or
shares were owned by his children who signed the mortgage to the Federal Building and Loan Association. The
certificate for 125 of the 285 shares was made out and
delivered to R. H. Spencer. It will be noted that R. H.
Spencer received something like 62 or 63 shares more
when he purcha:sed the Iand and water back from the
Federal Building and Loan Association than he had
when ho made tl1e mortgage to the Federal Building
and Loan Association. There i:s evidence that the Rugentobler water was in that certificate. Mr. Pederson, a witness called by tho administrator of the estate of R. H.
Spencer testified that the Hugentobler water came out
of the water claimed by the Federal Building and Loan
Association and not out of certificates 72 or 7B. ( Tr. 241.)
Mrs. Louise Spencer, the .vife of John

l~dison

Spen-

cer, testified that on May 30, 1946 when the deeds wore
delivered to .John .BJdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs
that Mrs. Tibbs mentioned that the deeds did not mention any water and that Daddy (R. H. Spencer) told
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her that when the litigation was finished and the water
was clear she would get water for her ground. That
Mr. Spencer also mentioned that water would go with
the other land. On cross examination she testified that
he gave ~Jdison certificate 84 and told him that was to
be his and have it transferred. (Tr. 852-854.) On crosss
examination an attempt was made to impeach Mrs. Spencer by caiiing her attention to her testimony given at
the time an administrator was appointed. Such testimony wiii be found on pages 856 to 864. At the former
hearing Mrs. Spencer did not testify about the delivery
of the water certificate but it wiii be, noted that the subject matter of inquiry on the former hearing was the
deeds which Mr. Spencer delivered to .John Edison
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, which deeds had been
brought in a sealed envelope from the office of Mr. Beal
at Manti.
John Edison Spencer testified that the certificate
for 125 shares was given to him along with the deed to
a tract of land (deed which is known as the Waupitz
land). That he went and ta:1ked to the secretary of the
Indianola Irrigation Company and he said he couldn't
transfer it to me, that thereafter he took it to the Federal Building and Loan Association to see if there was
an assignment from his father to him. (Tr. 626.) It
should be noted that the foregoing testimony of John
Edison Spencer was ob~ected to because the witness was
incompetent to testify. The objection was overruled because the administrator had waived the objection by in-
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quiring into what the witness had testified to on a prior
hearing. (See Tr. 466 and 467 and administrator's Exhibit 14.)
As to certificate numbered 72 the evidence shows
that it came out of certificate 57. (See photostatic copy
marked Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 9.) That
certificate No. 72 is dated December 30, 1933 and made
out to Richard H. Spencer, Pledgee Federal Land Bank
of Berkeley. It was so made out because Richard H.
Spencer intended to secure a loan from that Bank, but
the loan failed. That certificate was assigned to I. M.
Price, Richard H. Spencer having signed his name to
the same with the words "as part of security named in
mortgage.'' The evidence shows that I. M. Price at~
tempted to foreclose a mortgage on that certificate, together with certificate No. 72 and 160 acres of land.
(See John Edison Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 9, the same
being the official files of the district court of Utah
County.) It will be noted that the land therein described is in Sections 5 in Sanpete County and parts of
sections 33 and 34 in Township 11 South of Range 4
East of Salt Lake Meridian. iThe reporter has copied
all of the files in the transcript at pages 514 to 566.
There is also in evidence a certified copy of the mortgage which was sought to be foreclosed. It will be noted
that the mortgage is dated February 27, 1932 and was
acknowledged the same day.
It will be observed that with the land in Sanpete
County there is included 160 acres of water right. It
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will also be observed that the sheriff attempted to sell
the 160 acres of water used on Section 5, Township 12
South of Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The attempt was made by both the sheriff of Utah County and
Sanpete County. In the certificate of the sheriff of
Sanpete County dated February 4, 1937 certificates 72
and 73 are specifically mentioned. (See John Edison
Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 10.) ·So far as appears no
sheriff's deed to the land or bill of sale to the water were
ever executed by the sheriff.
In light of what occurred at the trial we shall not
devote any time to a discussion of the mortgage forecloure proceedings. We direct the attention of the court
to Administrator's Exhibits 12 and 16.
.BJarly in the trial counsel for ·whittaker and counsel for the administrator and counsel for the Indianola
Irrigation Company demanded that counsel who appeared by the record to represent Mr. Price show their autlwrity to do so. (See Tr. pages 10-58-59. Thereupon
.John Edison Spencer was sworn and testified touching
that matter. (See rrr. 59.) Mr. L. Leland Larson also testified about our authority to act for .Mr. Price. ( 'Jlr. s;385.) It will be noted that the trial of the cause began on
.June 2:l, 1947. '11 he evidence above referred to was given
on June 23 and 24. Later in the trial administrator's exhibit 12 was received in evidence. It will he noted that
such exhibit is dated July 14, 1947. It will also he noted
that administrator's exhibit 16 characterized as a deposition is dated the 1st day of March, 1947, several

31
months before the case came on for trial. No claim
is made that counsel for Mr. Price, if he had one,
or counse.l for .John IDdison Spencer or Elizabeth A.
'l'ibhs ever had any notice that a deposition was to
be taken. lt necessarily follows that to characterize
the administrator's EJxhibit 16 a deposition is a
a misnomer. However, the eon tents of that exhibit shows
that Mr. Price disclaimed any right, title or interest in
or to eertifi.cates 72 and 7:3. He states that he returned
it to R. H. Spencer in 1934. "I paid $600 for it ***
I do not claim any interest in it now. It was for a loan.
I do not O\\Te anything to H. H. Spencer's estate. H does
not owe me anything. T transferred the title to the water
stock, Nos. 72 and 73 and beneh property and vVansit
Farm back to H. H. Spencer in the fall of 1941."
ln this connection with the deal between Price and
R. H. Spem~er touching the two certificates 72 and 73
IS the testimony of .John Henry Peterson. ('l'r. 446.)
The court will have a difficult task to reconcile
the foregoing statements of I. M. Price with the mortgage foreclmmre proceedings had in Utah County to
which reference has heretofore been made.
The position of counsel who thought they were representing .Mr. Price was expressed by them at the trial.
(See Tr. 497-4!)8, and 920 and 92f).) It will be noted that
administrator's l£xhihit 16 was received in evidenee over
the objection of counsel for .John l<Jdison Spencer and
Mrs. Tibbs. (Tr. 918.)
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We have not changed our mind in such particular.
We shall not burden the court with an analysis of the
transaction had between I. M. Price and R. H. Spencer
touching certificates 72 and 73 because no matter what
view is taken of the evidence the results will be the
same, namely: that Price had a lien on the two certificates
as security for a loan. That when the loan was paid off
the certificates reverted to the persons who owned them
before the loan was made.
The evidence touching the ownership of certificate
No. 72 independent of the question of whether or not
the same is appurtenant to the land upon which it was
used consist of the following:
Louise Spencer testified that on May 30, 1946 when
the deeds were delivered R. H. Spencer stated that:
"when the litigation was finished and the water was
clear she (Mrs. Tibbs) would get water for her ground.
(Tr. 852.) Edison Spencer testified that according to
an arrangement had with Price and his father he, Edison,
was to pay to .the daughter of Price the sum of $1000,00
and certificate numbered 72 was to be given to Mrs.
Tibbs. (Tr. 608 and 640.)
Counsel for the administrator cross examined John
Edison Spencer at considerable length. (Tr. 738 to 749.)
Apparently counsel for the administrator deemed it of
considerable importance because Mr. Spencer at such
former hearings testified that he claimed only 5 shares
of water right. The fact was that at that time, as shown
by the evidence, in this case, Mr. John Edison Spencer
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did not, so far as he knew, have a record title on the
books of the company to the water. in dispute.
In the warranty deed dated May 31st, 1931 Richard
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer, his wife, conveyed "40
acres of land and 20 acres of water'' to Elizabeth A.
Tibbs. (Tr. 35 and 36.)

R. D. Tibbs, the husband of Elizabeth A. Tibbs,
testified that he (R. H. Spencer) told Edison and Mrs.
Tibbs that water went with the land that he conveyed to
Mrs. Tibbs. (Tr. 824.) That on another occasion when
the first deed was givn to :Mrs. Tibbs in 1943, he, R. H.
Spencer, was to get water for the land conveyed to her
as soon as the litigation was finished. (Tr. 828.)
Independent of any question of appurtenancy the
evidence bearing on the ownership of certificate No. 73
shows: That certificate is made out to the Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley as agent of the Land Bank Commissioner, pledgee of John E. Spencer. On the back of the
certificate it is assigned to I. M. Price by John E. Spencer, as security for loan to R. H. Spencer as per mortgage.
The warranty deed of Richard H. Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, to John E. Spencer conveys to
John E. Spencer: The North One Half of the Southwest
Quarter of Sec. 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian.
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''Together with 80 acres of water in what is lmown
as 'l'histle Creek". (See .John Eidson Spencer, et al, Exhibit 12.)
At the time of the death of R. H. Spencer and for
t;ome time prior thereto certificates numbered 72 and .
78 were in the possession of the firm of attorneys, Larson and Larson, until they were turned over to his present counsel. (Tr. 615 and 670-671 and 717-718.)
, We have directed the attention of the court to the
evidence in this case at greater length and in more detail
than usual in the statement of the case. vVe have done
so because there are so many exhibits brought up with
the record, a number of which were not received in evidence, and the evidence presented in the transcript is
so long that we have deemed it necessary to direct the
attention of the court to where the evidence which we
deem of importance may be found in the transcript. We
hope that we have succeeded in directing the attention
of the court to those portions of the evidence which are
of controlling importance, if not doubtless opposing
counsel will finish the undertaking.
ASSIGNMEN'rS OF J1JRROR
rrhe defandants and appellants John EJdison Spencer
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs jointly and severally make the
following assignments of error upon which they rely
for a reversal of the judgment appealed from and for
an order of this court directing the court below to make
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findings of fact, conclusions of la:w and a judgment as
prayed for by them in their pleadings:
1. The trial court erred in making that part of its
findings :wherein it is found that during the trial it :was
made to appear that such appearance and pleadings (for
Irwin M. Price) had not been authorized by him; for
the reason that such findings is :without support in the
evidence and is contrary to the clear preponderance
thereof. (J. R. 249.)

2. The trial court erred in holding that the trial
was had on a disclaimer of John Edison Spencer because
there was no disclaimer by John Edison Spencer to the
water right involved in this controversy. (J. R. 250.)
3. The trial court erred in that part of its finding
numbered 7 wherein it found that Richard H. Spencer
mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan Association, a corporation, 285 shares or acres of his said 448
acres of primary or class "A" :water right, that such
finding is without support in the evidence which affirmatively shows that Richard H. Spencer mortgaged
only 223 acres or shares of :water right to the Federal
Building and Loan Association. (J. R. 256.)
4. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 7 :wherein it found that he, Richard
H. Spencer, mortgaged 60 shares or acres of his said
448 acres of primary or class "A" :water right to M. H.
Hadlock for the use and benefit of the creditors of the
North Sanpete Bank. That such finding is :without sup-
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port in the evidence in that the mortgage is so ambiguous and uncertain as to be nuH and void. (J. R. 256.)
5. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 7 wherein it is found that on November 25, 1931 Richard H. Spencer conveyed to the
Indianola Irrigation Company by. deed 160 shares or
acres of his said 448 shares or acres of primary water
right. That the evidence and the preponderance thereof
shows that such conveyance was made on June 1st, 1918,
and the evidence shows that such deed was and is so
uncertain and ambiguous as to render it null and void.
(J. R. 256.)
6. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 7 wherein it found that: ''the said
conveyance of 160 acres of water right made by said
Richard H. Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation Company includes the 55 acres which he had previously mortgaged to Simon Hugentobler." That such finding is
wholly without support in the evidence and is contrary
to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. ( J. R. .
256.)

7.

The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 7 wherein it found in effect that the
160 acres of water conveyed to the Indianola Irrigation
Company included the 60 acres which, he, Richard
H. Spencer, had previously mortgaged to W. H. Hadlock. That such finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary to the preponderance thereof.
(J. R. 256.)
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8. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding nUilnbered 8 wherein it is in effect found that
Richard H. Spencer mortgaged to the FederarBuilding
and Loan Association 285 acres of water. That such
finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the clear preponderance thereof. (J. R.
256.)
9. The trial court erred by in effect finding in its
finding numbered ~) that in the case numbered 2888 civil
a valid foreclosure proceeding was had and a valid sheriff's deed was given conveying 60 acres or shares of
water to Rulon ~'. Starly, State Bank Commissioner of
the State of Utah. That such findings are without support in the evidence and on the contrary the evidence
shows that such proceedings were so ambiguous and
uncertain as to render the same null and void. ( J. R.
257.)
10. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 10 wherein it found that on May 22,
1939 Ru:lon F. Starly, State Bank Commissioner of the
State of Utah was the owner, for the use and benefit of
the creditors of North Sanpete Bank, of the right to the
use of said 60 acres of primary water right or 60 shares
of class "A" water right. That such finding is without
support in the evidence and is contrary thereto in that
the pretended mortgage sought to be foreclosed, the
notice of the pretended sale and the pretended sheriff's
deed are so uncertain and ambiguous as to render such
documents and proceedings null and void. (J. R. 258.)

:I
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11. The trial court erred m making that part of
its finding numbered 10 wherein it found that the Bank
Commissioner of Utah conveyed to this plaintiff 60 acres
of primary water right or 60 shares of class "A" water
right, the same being a part of the 448 shares of primary
or class "A" water so decreed to said Richard H. Spencer, in case No. 1406. That such findings is without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto in that the
pretended conveyance is so uncertain and ambiguous as
to render the same null and void and no title passed to
the plaintiff thereby. (J.R258)

12. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 10 wherein it found that the plaintiff
became and he has ever since been and now is the owner
in fee simple of the right to the use of 60 acres of primary
water right or 60 shares of class "A" water right of the
waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries for the irrigation of 60 acres of land in Section 3, Township 12
South, Range 4 FJast, Salt Lake Meridian, in Sanpete
County, State of Utah; that said 60 acres so owned by
this plaintiff are a part of the 1728 acres of primary or
class "A" rights mentioned and described in the decree
in case No. 1406 aforesaid and a part of the 448 acres of
primary water right or shares of class "A" rights decreed to said Richard H. Spencer in case No. 1406. That
such finding is without support in the findings but is contrary thereto for the reason that the conveyance under
which plaintiff claims title is so vague, uncertain and ambiguous as to be null and void. ( .J.R. 259.)
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13. rrhe court erred in making its finding numbered
11 and the whole thereof and particularily to that part of
finding numbered 11 wherein it is found that Richard H.
Spencer conveyed 285 acres of water to the .F'ederal
Building and Loan Association and that portion of said
finding that there are 115 shares of class ''A'' stock of
said corporation outstanding for which said corporation
has no water stock. (J.R. 259)
14. rrhe trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 15 wherein it found that plaintiff,
.James C. vVhittaker, now is and ever since the 22nd day
of :May, l!X3~) has been the owner, and entitled to the use
and enjoyment and ever since the !Jth day of December,
1~)37 ... he and his predecessors have been the owners and
entitled to the use and enjoyment of 60 acres or shares
of primal")' or class "A" water right in the waters of
rrhistle Creek and its tributaries, the same being a part
of the 448 acre:-; or shares of primary or Class" A" water
right so decreed to Richard H. Spencer by the decree
made and entered on May 6, 1920 in case No. 1406. rrhat
such part of finding numbered 16 is without support in
the evidence and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. 'l1 hat the evidence and the preponderance thereof
fails to show that Whittaker has title to such water right.
(.T.R. 260)
15. The court erred in finding in its finding numbered 17 that the plaintiff's title to 60 shares or acres
of water right included and that its va lue has been im1

paired or lessened for the reason that plaintiff has no
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title to the water right claimed by him. rrhat such part
of finding numbered 17 is without support in the evidence
and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 260~)
16. The trial court erred in making those parts of
its finding numbered 17 wherein it in effect found that
all of the claims of the defendants, except that of Que
.Jensen and the State of Utah, are subsequent and subordinate to the right and title of the plaintiff therein
and are void, and that none of the defendants to this
action has any right, title or interest in or to the said 60
acres of primary or class'' A'' water rights or part thereof. That :mch findings are without support in the evidence and the same are contrary to the evidence and the
preponderance thereof. ( J .R. 261)
17. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 18 because such finding is without support in
the evidence and the same is contrary to the evidence
and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262)
18. The trial court erred in making that part of finding numbered 19 wherein it found that the 5;) shares of
water right mortgaged to Simon Hugentobler and the
60 shares of water right mortgaged to the 8tate Bank
Commissioner-are part of the water right represented
by said certificates numbered 72 and 73 aforesaid and
particularly did the court err in making such finding as
it might affect the rights of the plaintiff and Simon Hugentobler because such finding is without any issue raised
by Simon Hugentobler and/or the plaintiff as neither of
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them made any such claim in the proceeding had to foreclose their respective mortgages. r:l1 hat such finding is
without support in the evidence in this case and is contrary to the same and the preponderance thereof, and
such finding is not within any issue raised by said plaintiff or by the successor in interest of Simon Hugentobler
in the present action, and is at variance with the pleadings of each of the above mentioned parties to this action.
( .T.R. 261 and 262.)
The trial court erred in making that part of its
l'inding numbered 20 which in effect found that the claim
of Irwin 11. Price to a lien on certificates numbered 72
and 73 was subsequent to the decree of foreclosure entered in case numbered 2888 civil for the reason that the
claim of Irwin M. Price originated on February 27, 1932
(See exhibit 1i3 of John gdison Spencer, et al) and as
found by this court in its finding numbered 9 was entered
on December 4, 1936. rrhat such finding is without support in the evidence and the same is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. ( J.R. 262)
1H.

20. That the trial court erred in making that part
of its finding numbered 20 wherein it found that said
certificates numbered 72 and 73 were returned to the
possession of Richard H. Spencer for the reason that
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and to the preponderance thereof. (J.R.
262)
21. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 wherein it found that at the time of
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his death Richard H. Spencer was the owner and in possession of said certificates and each of them and that
Richard Leo Spencer, as administrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer, deceased, is now entitled to 45
shares of the class "A" stock of the Indianola Irrigation
Company represented by certificates 72 and 73 after said
certificates shall have been surrendered to the Indianola
Irrigation Company and cancelled ami a new certificate
for 45 shares of said class "A" stock shall be issued in
lieu thereof. 'fhat such finding is without support in the
evidence and is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262)
22. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 wherein it found: "that the water
right represented by certificate No. 72 is not appurtenant
to the South Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 5,

Township 12 South, Hange 4 mast, Salt Lake Base and
:Meridian in Sanpete County, Utah, claimed to be owned
by Elizabeth A. Tibbs. That such finding is without sup~
port in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence and
the preponderance thereof. (.J.R. 262)
2i:3.

The trial court erred in making that part of

finding numbered 21 wherein it found that prior to the
death of Richard H. Spencer he did not cause to be conveyed and transferred to John Edison Spencer the water
right represented by certificates numbered 73 and numberecl84 in the Indianola Irrigation Company. rl'lwt such
finding is without support in the evidence and the same
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is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. ( J.R. 262)
24. The trial court erred in making its finding numbered 22 and the whole thereof. That such finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. (.J.R. 263)
25. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 23 and the whole thereof. That such finding is
without support in the evidence and the preponderance
thereof. (J.R. 263-4)
26. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 24 and the whole and each part thereof. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R.
264)
27. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 25 and the whole thereof. That such finding is
without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto
and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 264)
28. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 26 wherein it found that the deed
which was made and executed by Richard H. Spencer
and his wife as grantors to the Indianola Irrigation
Company as grantee * * * is not null or void and is of
full force and effect, that said deed * * * was actually
signed and executed by Richard H. Spencer and his wife
on November 25, 1931, and was never acknowledged by
Richard H. Spencer or his wife. That the above quoted
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parts of finding numbered 26 are without support in the
evidence and the same are contrary thereto and the clear
preponderance thereof.
29. The trial court erred in making its finding
numbered 27 and the whole and each part thereof. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R.
265.)
30. 'l'he tria11 court erred in its construction of
what was alleged and what was found and what was
adjudged in case numbered 2888 civil. That the court in
said case numbered 2888 made its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree as recited in such findings,
conclusions and decree and not otherwise.
31. The trial court erred in its finding numbered
28 wherein it found that the trial court in 2888 civil
found that the water rights involved in this action were
subsequent and that the rights claimed by John Edison
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs were inferior to the
rights of the plaintiff, that such rights were sold at public auction to the plaintiff. That such findings are without support in the evidence and are contrary thereto and
the preponderance thereof. ( J .R. 266.)
32.

The trial court erred in that part of its finding

numbered 28 wherein it found that the water rights
involved in this action were sold and conveyed to the
plaintiff herein and that the plaintiff herein has been
and now is the owner of such water rights. That such
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finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary
thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 266)
i33. The trial court erred in its finding numbered
28 wherein it is found that Richard H. Spencer has filed
his verified disclaimer in and to the water rights involved in this action. The trial court likewise erred in its
finding numbered 28 wherein it found that John Edison
Spencer has filed his disclaimer to any of the water
rights involved in this action. That such finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and
the preponderance thereof. More particularly the water
rights which were disclaimed by Richard H. Spencer and
John Edison Spencer and described in plaintiff's complaint and particularly paragraph XIV thereof were
"the right to the use of 60 acres of primary rights or 60
shares of class ''A'' water rights of the waters of Thistle
Creek and its tributaries for the irrigation of 60 acres of
land in Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, in Sanpete County. That the water rights
here involved were never used on any land in Section 3
above described. (See record 8) (.J.R. 266)
i34. The trial court erred in making that part of
its finding numbered 28 wherein it found that the disclaimer of Richard H. Spencer has never been withdrawn,
modified or questioned in this action and is still binding
upon him and all persons, including John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, and likewise erred in finding
tba t the alleged disclaimer of John Edison Spencer has
never been withdrawn, dismissed, set aside, modified,
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annuled or repudiated by him and is still binding upon
him. That such findings and each of them is without
support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the
preponderance thereof. And more particularly the trial
court permitted both the administrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer to file an
answer to the merits of plaintiff's complaint and the
case was tried on the issues raised by plaintiff's complaint and the answers thereto of the administrator of
the estate of Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer. That plaintiff's counsel <lid not object to the trial on
the merits; that by such proceedings the alleged disclaimer was in legal effect vacated and set aside. (J.R.
266)
i35. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 20 wherein it is found that the decree
in No. 2888 civil has been and now is a valid, subsisting
and fmal ;judg1nent and decree of said _court with respect
to the water rights therein described and which are the
same water rights claimed by the plaintiff in this action,
and with respect to the water rights claimed by the plaintiff in this action, and with respect to the validity of the
mortgage of the plaintiff in said action and with respect
to the validity of the mortgage lien described in said
action. rrlmt such finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the preponderance
thereof. (J.R. 267)

:16.

The trial court erred in making subsection "b''
of its finding numbered 28 and each part and the whole
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thereof. That such finding is without support in the
evidence and is contrary thereto and the preponderance
thereof. ( J.R. 267)
:37. The trial court erred in making subsection "c"
of its finding numbered 28 and each part thereof. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (.T.R.
267)
38. 'l'he trial court erred in making its 1st conclusion of law and each part thereof. That such conclusion
of law is without support in the findings of fact and is
likewise without support in the evidence. (J.R. 268)

i39. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its
conclusion of law wherein it concluded that Que Jensen
is entitled to fifi/1728ths of the flow of said stream. 'l'hat
such conclusion is without support in the evidence and is
likewise vvithout support in the findings of fact.
40. 'rhe trial comt erred in making its conclusion of
law munlwre<l 3 and each part thereof. That such conclusion of law is without support in the evidence and is likewise without support in the finding-s of fact. ( J.R. 267)
41. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 5 and each part thereof. That such
conclusion of law is without support in the evidence
and likewise is without support in the findings of fact.
(J.H. 270)
42. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 6 and the whole thereof. That such
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is likewise without support in the findings of fact.(J.R.
271)

4:1. The trial court erred in making its judgment
and decree contained in paragraph 1 and each part
thereof in so far as said judgment affects the defendants
and appellants John F.Jdison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
rribbs, or either of them. That such judgment and decree
is without support in the evidence and is likewise without
support in the findings of fact and is against law. (J.R.
274)

44. The trial court erred in making that part of its
jud.t,'1.nent contained in paragraph 2 thereof wherein it
adjudged that Que .Jensen is awarded 55/1728th of the
flow of said stream. That such judgment or decree is
without support in the evidence and is likewise without
support in the findings of fact. (J.R. 274)
45. The trial court erred in making paragraph 3 of
its judgment in so far as the same affects the defendants
and appellants ,John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs, or either of them. That said paragraph 3 of the
judgment or decree in so far as the same affects the
defendants and appellants John Edison Spencer and
!1Jlizabeth A. Tibbs is without support in the evidence
and is likewise without support in the findings of fact
and is against law. (J.R. 274)
46.

The trial court erred m making its judgment

or decree contained in paragraph 5 thereof. That the
judt,rment therein contained is without support in the
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evidence and is likewise without support in the findings
of fact and is contrary to law. (J.R. 275)

4-7. rrhe trial court erred in making its conclusions
of law numbered 6 and the whole thereof. That the
judt:,r:rnent contained in said paragraph 6 is without support in the evidence and ilikewise without support in the
findings of fact and the same is contrary to law. (J.R.
267)
48. The trial court erred in not making findings of
fact, conclusions of law. and decree awarding to .John
J1~dison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs the rights to the
use of the waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries
as prayed for in their counterclaim and cross complaint.

Ml. The trial court erred in denying the motion of
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer to strike
each and all of the allegations sought to be stricken by
their motion filed in this cause on April 22, 1942. ( J.R.
41 to 44)

· 50. The trial court erred in overruling the demurrer of Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer filed
in the above entitled cause on June 00, 1943. (.J.R. 48-49.)

ARGUMENT
vVe have heretofore in our statement of the case
directed the attention of the court to the testimony of
.John Edison Spencer and L. Leland Larson, who at the
trial was one of coqnsel for John Edison Spencer and
Elizabeth A. 'l'ibbs hut who is no longer of counsel for
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them because he was subsequent to the trial of the cause
appointed to the District Court of the Seventh .Judicial
District of Utah.

It will be seen from such testimony that opposmg
eonnse1 requested that counsel who claimed to be representing Irwin M. Price s}ww their authority so to do.
Thereupon .John Edison Spencer was called and testified
that he was authorized by Irwin M. Price to secure counsel to represent him. That he had a letter wherein he was
granted such authority. He said the letter was at his
home and that he would produce the letter the following
day. He was unable to find the letter. (Tr. 59 to 62 and
81-82) '11 hereupon L. Leland Larson was called and after
being sworn testified that he is an attorney at law and
has been engaged in the practice of law since 192~); that
he has known Irwin 1\f. Price since about 1940; that the
firm of which he was a member represented Mr. Price for
the period up to the time his firm had withdrawn; that he
had been reemployed in connection with me; that he had
ealled l\f r. Price at San Francisco by telephone and told
him that there was a dispute about whether he was being
represented by you and by me in this ease and asked him
if he had authorized Edison Spencer to employ you in
this case, and he said he had, and I told him that I had
been associated in the case by you and Edison had asked
me to come in the case, and he said that it was alright. I
asked him if he would ratify everything we had done in
eonneetion with the matter up until the present time and
he said he did and if there was any question about it go
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ahead and fight it until we were satisfied the matter was
cleared up one way or another. (Tr. 84-85)
In the light of testimony it is easy to understand
why .1\Ir. Larson would make the statement he did make
as set out on pages 926 and 927 of the transcript. There
is no competent evidence to the contrary. There was
admitted in evidence administrator's Exhibits 12 and 16.
I think no lawyer will seriously contend that such exhibits are competent evidence, except to show that I. M.
Price no longer claimed the water right in question.
When counsel for John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
'ribbs objected to the introduction of Exhibit 16, counsel
represented that he offered such exhibit for the purpose
of rebutting the evidence theretofore offered tending to
show that Irwin M. Price owned certificates 72 and 73.
('rr. 917 to 921)
Notwithstanding the evidence above quoted and referred to the trial court in its preliminary findings found
that: "Appearances had been made and various pleadings filed for and on behalf of Irwin 11. Price but during
the trial it was made to appear that such appearances and
pleadings had not been authorized by him." ( J.R. 249)
If such a finding upon such evidence is to be justified
then indeed is the practice of law a precarious profession. If such a finding on such a record is to be sustained
every lawyer may be subject to disbarment because he
has pretended to represent a client when he knows that
he has no such authority or because he knowingly and
falsely testified that he had, on the night before giving
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such testimony, received the express authority to continue to represent his client. All of these results can be
accomplished by opposing counsel or their clients, without any notice or knowledge to accused counsel of what
is to be attempted, securing an affidavit from the client
of accused counsel that such counsel has no authority to
represent his client. We submit that such is not the law,
never has been the law and we hope never will be the
law, not even in this case, except in the mind of the trial
court and those who may have induced it to sign the
findings in this case.
We are still somewhat at a loss to know just what
our duties are towards Irwin M. Price. It would certainly
ill become us to argue that he never acquired any rights
under the mortgage foreclosure proceeding which he
prosecuted to judgment. Nor can we well argue that he
presently has an interest in the water rights involved in
this action because, if we did that, we would be confronted with the document marked Inxhibit 16 which, while improperly ealled a deposition, does have the effect of disclaiming any interest in the water right here involved or
the land upon which it has at all times been used. Under
such circumstances the writer of this brief has concluded
to take Mr. Price at his word, namely: that he secured the
water certificates 72 and 73 as security for a loan made
to Richard H. Spencer who has paid the loan and the
certificates have been returned to Richard H. Spencer
and the whole transaction cancelled.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO
PLAIN rt' 1 F F' 60/1728ths AND TO QUE JFJNSI<JN
55/1728ths Ol<' THE~ FLOW OF THlSTLl~ CR~l<JK
AND ITS 'I'RIBU'r ARUJS.
'rhe articles of incorporation of the Indianola Irrigation Company, (Indianola Irrigation Company's J<Jxhibit 7) among other things, provides:
''Article 5.
"The capitol stock of this corporation shall
be $80,000 Eighty Thousand Dollars divided into
Twenty Two Hundred shares as follows: Eighteen Hundred shares of class ''A'' stock of the
par value of Forty Dollars per share and Four
Hundred shares of Class "B" stock of the par
value of Twenty Dollars per share."
Article 19 provides in substance that from March
15th to June 15th class ''A'' and class '' B'' stockhoilders
shall be entitled to an equal amount of water per share.
After June 15th to the following March lst of the following year each share of class "A" stock shall entitle the
holder to 1/40 of a second foot, and if there is any water
left over after supplying the cllass "A" stockholders
during the period extending from .June 1.5th to March 1st
of the following year the same shall be divided prorata
to the stockholders of the class "B" stock. So far as appears the water right has been divided as provid~d in the
articles of incorporation. ·Obviously if Que Jensen is
awarded 55/1728 of the flow of Thistle Creek he will get
more water than he is entitled to. There were at least
1728 shares of class "A" stock and 490 shares of 0lass
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"B" stock outstanding at the time of the trial. (Tr. 311)
Obviously if Que Jensen gets 55/1728 of the water of
Thistle Creek as decreed to him he will get not only
water to supply his 55 shares of class "A" water right
but also a portion of tl1e class "B" water right. He does
not have and so far as the record shows never has had
any class "B" stock. Thus if the a ward made to Que
Jensen is affirmed the other stockholders, including
John Edison Spencer, will be deprived of a part of their
water rights.
What we have said in i>upport of the attack made on
the conclusion of 'law and decree in our assignments
numbered 39 and 44 as to the water decreed to Que J ensen applied to the water right awarded to the plaintiff
James C. Whittaker which we have attacked by our assignments numbered 38 and 43.
It will be noted in the conclusions of law and decree
so attacked the court concludes and decrees to plaintiff
.James C. -Whittaker 60;/1728 of the waters of rrhistle
Creek notwithstanding even if he is entitled to prevail
in this action, contrary to our contention, as to 60 acres
or ::.;hares of class "A" water right he is, even in such
event, not entitled to the quantity of water awarded to
him. There is no evidence that Whittaker ever owned or
even claimed any class "B" water right yet by the decree
he is awarded not only water stock which goes with 60
acres or shares of class" A" water right but in addition

thereto 60/1728 of the class "B" water rights of 'l'histle
Creek and its tributaries.

55
THJ<J l\fORTOAOJ<J, TI-ll<~ C011 PLAIN'r SEEKING TO
FORECLOSJ<J THID MORTGAGJD, 'l'HI<J DECREJ<J OF
FOHJ<JCLOSUHI<J, 'l'HJD SHJ<JRJFF''S DFJFJD '1'0 HADLOCK, BANK COMl\1ISSIONFJH AND TIUJ DEED
TO THJ<J Pl,AfN'rlFF~ THHOUGH \VfHCH PLAJN'l'IFF' CLAIMS 'l'l'l'Ll<J AIUJ SO VAGUI<J, AMBIGUOUS AND UNCJ<JR'l'AIN 'rHA'l' PLAIN'I'H-,I<' ACQUIRJ1JD NO 'rTTLJ<} 'l'O WA'L'ERS IN CON'L'ROV"J<JHSY BY RI<JASON TJUJREOF.

Our assignments num he red :3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1:1, 14,
1i>, 17, 18, 24, 2fi, 2s, 2D, :3o, :n, :32, :l:l, :34, :35
JG, :37 and il.S may well and will he grouped and disenssed
under this heading in so far as they affect the claim made
hy \Vhi ttaker to GO shares or acres of Class ''A'' water
right in Thistle Creek and its tributaries.

..

At the outset ,.,.e di!"eet the attention of the court to
om statutor~· law and the authorities dealing with the
deeree of certainty required in the description of property which is eonveyed or mortgaged, in order to render
such conveyance or mortgage valid.
"While it is not entirely dear whether plaintiff seeks
to recover the right to the use of the sixty shares or
acres on the theory that the same is appurtenant to real
estate and as snch subject to the law affecting real property or on the theory that the water is personal property. It would ;;;eem however in the final analysis plaintiff
bottoms his claim upon the claim that the 60 shares or
acres of water right is real estate and appurtenant to
some land. In any event the degree of certainty is the
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same whether it he real or personal property except
where the pen;ona,J property is delivered to the mortgagee. ln this case neither the plaintiff nor the hank
eonnnissioner under whom he claims title was ever in
th.e possession of any water certificate nor have they or
either of tl1em ever heen in possession or l!ad the us~ of
tl1e water which is claimed by the plaintiff.

It is said in i~(j Am ..Jur., ~:<cdions 42, 4:~ and 47, page
711 and 712 that:
~ection 42. wwhile there is authority to
the effed that the courts more dosely scrutinize,
and require a higher degree of crtainty in, the
description of property in a mortgage than in an
absolute eonveyance. generally the rules as to
descriptions of real estate in mortgages conform
to tho:,;e with respect to description:,; in deed:,;.
ln this connection it has been held that Inistakes
in the matter of deseription do not vitiate the
:,;ecurity any more than they would a conveyance
of the land, provided they are capable of correction, and that a mortgage wil;J not he invalidated
by reason of an error in the de:,;cription of the
property, in ca:,;e the remainder of the de8cription,
after rejecting the erroneous portion, is sufficiently definite to enable the land to b(~ located.
1n regard to an ambiguity in a mortgage, thtmodern tendency is to allow a liberal interpretation of the description of the property and to uphold the validity of the mortgage if in any way
it is possible to arrive at the intention of the
parties thereto. Mortgages are also frequently
upheld against attacks based upon the indefiniteness of the mortgage. In this respect, any reference or description by which the premises in-
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tended to be dealt with may be found and identified it> generally regarded as sufficient, and a
description wiill not be deemed insufficient if, by
any reat>onable construction of its terms, it can
be held to inclose or embrace a particular tract
of land. Furthermore, a description may be sufficient even though it may be necest>ary ·on account of its imperfect or indefinite character to
ai(l the intention of the parties by averring and
proving extrinsic facts. Accordingly, in order
to identify the property intended to be mortgage(l, and to give affect to the intention of the
TJarties to the instrument, parol evidence is generally held admissible to explain a mistake i11
<lescription of property in a mortgage, or to ex.
plain and remove an uncertainty. However, if
tlw (leseription of the land is so vag·ue and indefinite that effect could not be given the instrument without writing iww materia,] language into
it, parol Pvidence is not admissible. A mortgage
must contain such a certain and definite description of the property encumbered as to make it the
subject of the charge created.''
Reetion 4:1. "rrhe old classification of ambiguities into "latent" and "patent" is still appliecl by many courts to descriptions of property
in mortgages of real estate. The general rule
nn(ler this distinction is that a patent ambiguity
in a mortgage -may not he removed by. parol evidence. Within the meaning of this rule, a patent
ambiguity is such an uncertainty appearing on the
face of the instrument that the court, reading the
language in the light. of all the facts and circumstances referred to in the instrument, is unable to derive therefrom the intention of the
parties, as to what l)and was to be conveyed. The
reason for the r.ule is that otherwise new Ian-
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guage would be inserted into the instrument. In
any event, it is clear that a latent ambiguity in
a mortgage may be explained and removed by
parol evidence. Within the meaning of this rule,
a latent ambiguity is an uncertainty which does
not appear on the face of the instrument, but is
shown to exist for the first time by matter outside the writing, when an attempt is made to
apply tho writing to the property. The reason for
the rule is that the ambiguity having been revealed hy matter outside the instrument, it may
he removed in the same manner. A typical instance of a latent ambiguity in a mortgage is a
case where the description applies equally to
each of two things. There is a so-called interrne<liate type of ambiguity which partakes of the
nature of both a latent and patent ambiguity, to
explain which parol evidenee is generalJy held to
he admissible.''
Section 47. '"l'he general rule is that parol
evidence is admissible where land is described
in a mortgage as a'' part'', ''half'', or'' fraction'',
with a further desm·iption sufficient to serve as
a guide to the location of the land intended to be
eonveyed. This rule also prevai'ls where the mortgage refers to a certain number of acres out of a
particular tract of land. vVhere, however, the instrument does not contain a description sufficient
to point out tho way for the identification of the
land, parol evidence is not admissible, because the
mortgage must set forth a subject matter, either
eertain within itself or capable of being made
certain by extrinsic matter to which tho instrument refers.''

59
For other general discussions of the certainty required in a deed or real estate mortgage see 12 L.R.A.
177; 41 C. J. 399 and cases there cited.
1t has been stated generally that where the description is such that the sheriff could readily ascertain the
parcel to be sold by him and the surveyors locate it the
description is sufficient, otherwise not. ~ee 137 Am. St.
Rep. 2:>3. Such is the purpose of the statutory law of
Utah. U.C.A. 1943, 104-1:3-4 provides:

"In an action for the recovery of real estate
it must be described in the complaint with such
certainty as to enable an officer upon execution
to identify it."
The following holdings of cases will show the trend
of judicial authority:
R1f;nch rs. Crowe (Ark.) 203 S.W. 584 wherein a

mortgage on real estate contained the following description:
"Residue of the West Half of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 4, Township 2 North, Range
2 J;Jast, containing 78 acres.''
lt is held that the description is too vague and indef-inite
to constitute a valid mortgage and the same was void.
In the case of Harris vs. Wooda.nl (N. C.) 41 S.E.
790 the mortgage contained this description:

''Certain tract of land including Grist mill
and fixtures and one store house, including 3
acres.''
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']Jte whole tract consisting of 40 acres was described in
the mortgage. It was held that every deed of conveyance
must set forth a subject matter either certain in itself or
capable of being reduced to a certainty by recurrence
to something extrinsic to which the deed refers.
In the case of Cathey vs. Lumber Co. (N.C.) 66 S.E.
fl80' the deed conveyed '' 324 acres of land of a certain
tract composed of Lots 44, 97, 98 in Graham County."
'Phe entire tract within the lots described consisted of
724 acres. It was held that the deed furnished no means
by whielt the 324 acres could be identified and set apart
nor did it refer to something extrinsic to it by which the
acres sought to be conveyed could be located. It is held
that it is self evident that a certain part of a whole cannot he set apart unless the part can be in some way identified. Therefore where a grantor undertakes to convey a part of a tract of land his conveyance must itself
furnish the means by which the part can be located;
otherwise the deed is void, for i,t is e:lementary that every
deed of conveyance must set forth a subject matter,
either certain within itself or capable of being made
certain by recurrence to something extrinsic to which
the deed refers.
In the case of Wilson vs. Oalhoun (Tenn.) 11 S. W.
( 2d) 908 it is said:
"The degree of certainty with which the
premises must be denoted is defined in many
books and the cases are extremely numerous in
which the subject has been illustrated. They are

I '
'
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not all harmonious. But they agree in this, that
it is essential that the description have such particulars and tokens of identification as to render
a resort to extrinsic aid entirely needless when
the writing comes to be applied to the subject
matter. The terms may be abstract and of a general nature hut they must be sufficient to fit and
comprehend the property which is the 1mbject of
the transaction, so that with the assistance of
external evidence the description, without being
contradicted or added to can be connected with
and applied to the very property intended and
to the exclusion of all other property.''
An instructive case is that of M a.r,well vs. JYfaxwell,
(Wash.) 123 Pac. (2d) 335 where a number of other
eases are cited. It will be observed from that ease that
when a conveyance is vague and ambiguous there must
be dear and convincing proof of the intention of the
grantor before a court of equity will reform the deed.
In this case apparently no attempt was made to reform
the mortgage in the course of the proceedings to foreclose the same.
The ease of Jacobsen vs. Chrristenson, 18 Utah 149,
fi5 Pac. f'l62 involved the validity of a mortage on 700
head of sheep. While that case deals with a chattel mortgage as heretofore indicated the requirements of real
estate mortgages and mortgages on personal property
as to the definiteness in descriptions is the same or substantially so. We quote the following from the syllabus
which reflects the opinion of the court in that ease:
''A mortgage of a specific number of sheep out
of a herd comprising a much larger number of
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similar sheep, which does not separate or designate the sheep mortgaged is void for uncertainty."
Applying the principles announced in the foregoing
cases to the case in hand it will be seen that the Hadlock
mortgage falls squarely within that class of mortgages
which are held void for uncertainty. R H. Spencer at
the time he executed the mortgage to Hadlock was the
owner of 448 shares or acres of water right to Thistle
Creek and its tributaries. True he had mortgaged some
water right to the Federal Building and Loan Association but he was none the less the owner thereof when
the Hadlock mortgage was executed. There is absolutely nothing in the Hadlock mortgage from which the
court can conclude that the mortgage was a first mortgage. There is some very substantial evidence to the
effect that the water right which was intended to be
covered by the Hadlock mortgage was for water used
on some Indian lands in Section 3, which lands were
taken away from R. H. Spencer. H. M. Spencer, a son of
R. H. Spencer, on cross examination by counsel for the
plaintiff testified:
''That at one time his father secured a deed
from the Indians for that land: The deed was
secured about 30 years ago. (Tr. :186-387.) That
water was used on that land, which consisted of
160.7 acres. No decree was ever entered for that
water right." (Tr. 389-390.)
ln plaintiff's complaint filed herein he apparently claims
the water right to which he seeks to quiet title is water
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used on Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian. (See the 'l,ast part of paragraph
14. R. 8.)
The evidence in this case shows without conflict that
the water right here involved and represented by the
certificates of shares was always used on Sections 5
and 8. No part of it was ever used on Section 3.
If we examine the mortgage given to the Bank
Commissioner there is no language therein which even
remotely sheds any light on what shares or acres of
water right was mortgaged, except that it was "sixty
shares or acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock
Creek in addition to the waters used for the irrigation
of the above described land. The lands described in the
mortgage was only a part of Section 3. (See Exhibit
"G" attached to the amended complaint in case numbered 2888 which is marked: "John Edison Spencer,

et al. Exhibit 14.)
'l'here are two files in 2888, the one just referred to is
File No. 1.
The decree of foreclosure contains the same description of the sixty shares which were attempted to be
foreclosed as does the mortgage. No more and no less.
(See paragraph 1 of the decree of foreclosure in case
2888.) Likewise the notice of sale contains identically

the same description of the 60 acres or shares of water
as is contained in the mortgage. So also the return of
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the sheriff and the sheriff's deed contain identically the
same description as does the mortgage. (See abstract
plaintiff's Exhibit "W".) When the bank commissioner
made the deed out to the plaintiff he placed therein
~ome embelishing languaw~. (See 'rr. 97.) Of course
we believe, no one not even counsel for the plaintiff,
Whittaker, will claim that the recitals contained in such
conveyance en'larged or corrected any infirmity that
theretofore existed in the title to the bank commissioner.
Moreover, in such conveyance the bank commissioner
did not have the temerity to describe the water right conveyed, except to state that the same came out of the 448
acres or shares of class "A" water right decreed to
Richard H. Spencer. Now here in the entire chain of
title is there a scintilla of evidence which meets the requirements laid down by the authorities above cited,
namely: that when the conveyance or mortgage does not
contain a description sufficient to point out the way for
the identification of the land, evidence is not admissible
to determine the land intended because the mortgage
or other conveyance must set forth a subject matter
which is certain within itself or capable of being made
certain by extrinsic matters to which the in~trmnent refers. None of the instruments through which plaintiff
claims title refer to any decree or any shares of capital
stock or other matters to point out the particular water
stock, except the deed from the bank commissioner to the
plaintiff docs mention that the water conveyed came out

I

of the 448 shares of stock once decreed to Richard H.

i

Spencer.

i

I
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In connection with the authorities above mentioned
the attention of the court is directed to the provisions
of U.C.A. 1943, 104-13-4. It is there provided:
''In an action for the recovery of real property it must be described in the complaint with
suc.h certainty as to enable an officer, upon execution, to identify it."
This court has construed the foregoing statute in
Drake vs. 8rnith, 14 Utah 35, 45 Pac. 1006; Cente.r Creek
lrrig. Co. L's. Lindsay, 21 Utah 1~}2, 60 Pac. 559; Pi.tchsos
vs. Jones, et al 76 Ut. 6, 290 Pac. ~J58.

U.C.A. 1943, 104-:-37-29 provides that upon the sale
of real property the officer inust give to the purchaser
a certificate of the sale containing:
( l) A particular description of the real property
sold. So also must a judgment be certain and specific.
When and only when a judment is ambit,ruous may it be
aided by the pleadings and other parts of t.he record
and if the description obtainable from it and them would
be sufficient if found in a conveyance to divest title
of the grantor it will be sufficient to sustain sa les made
or possession taken under the judgment otherwise all
proceedings under it must be treated as void."
1

Freeman on .Judgnwnts, 5 Ed., Vol. 1, page 165, 166,
Sec.

~)6:

Jn support of the foregoing quotation of the eminent
author there are collected a number of cases to which
the court is referred if they should desire to examine
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cases from other jurisdictions. We, however, will not
burden the court with an analysis of cases from foreign
jurisdictions, because, as we believe, the cases in this
jurisdiction point the way to a proper determination
of thjs phase of the case.
The question of the degree of certainty required
m a judgment or decree dealing with water rights has
been before our Supreme Court in a number of cases,
among them being:
l<Jlliot vs. Whitmore, 8 Utah 254, 30 P. ~)84.
Smith vs. Phillips, 6 Ut. i376, 2:1 Pac. 932.
Nephi Irrigation Co. vs. Vickers, 15 Ut. 374, 49 Pac. 301.
:Sharp vs. Whitmore, 51 Ut. 14, 168 Pac. 273.
Other cases from neighboring states are:
"\Valsh vs. Wa'llace, 26 Nev. 299; 67 Pac. 914, 918.

Riverside \Vater Co. vs. Sargent, 112 Cal. 2:10; 44 Pae.
560.
Lillis vs. :E:mmigrant Ditch Co., 95 Cal. 553, 30 Pac. 1108.
In the case of Sharp vs. Whitman it is said:
''One of the essentials of a valid judgment
is that the judgment be definite and certain respecting the relief granted. In judgments defining
and determining conflicting claims, rights, and interests in and to the use of water in this arid
region is indispensable. The rule, the soundness
of which is self evidence, is so well established
that it would be a work of supererogation to cite
authorities illustrating and supporting it.''
Whi'le the cases above cited deal with the matter of
uncertainty in the quantity of water involved the prin-
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ciples of law there announced are equally applicable
here. It would seem to be at least as vital to the validity
of a decree to identify the water sought to be decreed
as it is to fix the flUantity of the water affected by the
decree.
The necessity of the requirement that a judgment
to be valid must be certain is well illustrated by the proceedings had in this case. After the so-called judgment
was rendered the sheriff, armed with a writ of assistance
attempted to find the water which it was c'laimed had
been sold under foreclosure. He was unable to do so.
An officer of the banking department with the assistance
of the present counsel for the plaintiff undertook in
vain to find the water which he claims was conveyed to
him by the purchaser under the foreclosure proceedings.
The secretary of the defendant company was at a loss
to know what water right was sold pursuant to the foreclosure proceedings. ( Tr. 86 and 199.) Finally in desperation this action is brought to quiet title to 60 acres
or shares of water right which at one time it is claimed
was included in the 448 shares or acres of water owned
by Richard H. Spencer.
As we have heretofore pointed out so far as appears
from the description in the mortgage in the findings of
fact, and in the judgment itself the sixty acres or shares
now claimed by the plaintiff is equa'lly applicable to any
sixty acres or shares of the 448 acres or shares once
owned by Spencer. To say that such water right was confined to a water right that was free and clear of encum-
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brance is to read into the mortgage language foreign
thereto. So also to argue that the decree of foreclosure
deseribed any particular sixty acres or shares of the
water right formerly owned by R. H. Spencer is bottomed
upon a false premise. It is of the very essence of a valid
judgment that it must finally fix and determine the right
of the parties on the issues submitted by specifically
denying or granting the relief sought by the action.
49 C ..J.S. page G et seq. Under the provision:-; of U.C.A.
1943, 104-14-4 a court may within ninety days after a
judt,'lJlent is rendered, upon proper showing, set aside
or amend the same. In this case no application was
made to amend the judgment within the time allowed
by law or for that matter has such an application yet
been made by any party to the jud.!-,'lnent. Notwithstanding the plaintiff in this case was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding he is in effect seeking to amend the
foreclosure proceeding under the guise of a suit to quiet
title.

It is solely because of uncertainty and ambiguity of
the decree of foreclosure and the sale had pursuant
thereto that there is any controversy between the parties to this proceeding as to what water right was mortgaged, or as to what water right was ordered foreclosed and sold under the foreclosure proceedings. It
may be that if, by proper pleading and proof, the plaintiff had alleged that Spencer intended to mortgage a
specified 60 shares or acres of water right and the proofs
had sustained such an averment the p'laintiff would

69
have heen entitled to a decree of foreclosure on the water
right so alleged and shown. That, however, was not done.
To permit the plaintiff, who was not even a party to the
foreclosure proceding, at this late date to re-litigate
what should have been litigated in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding is without support in either statutory
or common law and is contrary to the adjudicated cases.
See 49 C.J.S., page 436, et seq., Section 229, 230, and
eases cited in the foot notes.
In this connection it may be noted that the validity
and effect of a judgment must be determined from the
lan§.,'Uage contained in the judgment itself, provided if
a judgment is uncertain and ambiguous resort may be
had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 30
Am. Jur., 998, 81ec. 284 and cases cited in the foot note.
In this connection it will be observed that in case
numbered 2888 it was, among other matters, decreed:
"that the defendants, Richard H. Spencer, Annie H.
Spencer, John Edison Spencer, Robert 0. Tihbs and
mli~abeth A. Tibbs be and are hereby restrained and
enjoined from in any way assigning, transferring, disposing of or encumbering certificates of stock numbered 72 and 73 issued by the Indianola Irrigation Company, or the water rights represented by said certificates, or any other water right held or claimed by said
defendants in the waters of Thistle Creek, clear Creek
or Rock Creek until the further order of this court.''

It will further be noted that neither in the original
complaint or in his amended complaint did Hadlock
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mention or seek to foreclose a mortgage on either certificate No. 72 or 7.3 or any other certificate or any specified shares or acres of water belonging to Richard H.
Spencer. Hadlock was content in his mortgage foreclosure proceeding to rely on the vague, uncertain
description contained in his mortgage which as we
heretofore pointed out was void hecam;e of its uncertainty.
If the court that tried case No. 2888 had intended
that the Hadlock mortgage should have been forclosed
as to certificates 72 and 73 it would have so ordered. The
fact that it did not so order conclusively shows that the
court did not so intend. Nor could the court bind the
parties if it had so intended because to have so intended
would have been without support in the findings and
conclusions.

·,

(

It is an elementary principle of law that a judgment
is valid only to the extent that the same is supported by
the pleadings. The 'law in such particular is thus expressed by our own Supreme Court in the case of Cooke vs.
Cooke, 67 Utah 271, 248 P,ac. 83, at page 104 of the
Pacific reports:

'' gvery court must acquire jurisdiction from
its record which every court must have and keep
and which binds the court; and there is no principle better established than what is not juridically presented cannot be jurisdically decided.
Just as elemental is it that pleadings are the
juridical means of investing a court with jurisdiction of the subject matter to adjudicate it and
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that a jud~:,"''nent or decree beyond or not within
them is a nullity, for the court is bound by its
record. These are immutable elements."
In the case of Stockyards Nat. Barnk vs.
Bra[!g, et al, 67 Utah 60; 245 Pac. 966 it is said
that:
'' 'l1 hough court may have jurisdiction of subject matter and person, it may 'not act or make
an order or render a judgment beyond or in
excess of jurisdiction.''

"vVhile requisite jurisdictional facts need
not he reeited in order or judgment to properly
invest court with jurisdiction of subject matter,
they must somewhere be made to appears in record that describes matter for court's adjudication and is foundation of judgment or order."
'' J udf.,"''llent which is beyond or not supported
hy pleadings must fail.''
".Judgment mm;t fail on showing on face of
mandatory record that it was obtained at variance
with practice of court or contrary to well recognized principles and fundamentals of law."
''Fact apparent from mandatory record,
showing that fundamental law was disregarded
in establishing of judgment, will render it void
for all purposes.''
"Judt,rment founded on record, showing that
fundamenta·J law was disregarded in its establishment, is suh,ject to direct and collateral attack,
and will sua sponte he noticed by courts and acted
upon by them without regard to wishes or relations of parties named on record."
rrhe foregoing quotations are from the syllabi to
thP opinion and reflect the opinion of the court.
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The law with respect to the necessity of judgment or
decree being supported by pleadings, is discussed in
Vol. 1 Freerna,n on Judgments 6 Ed. Sec. ~)7, pag1e 168.
49 C. J. 8. page 95, et seq., sections 40 and 41.
ln connection with such law it will be noted that
there is nothing in the complaint which even remotely
indicates that plaintiff in 2888 sought to foreclose a
mortgage on certificates 72 or 73 or any other water
represented by certificates or any water right which was
appurtenant to any particular tract of land. So far as
is made to appear from the allegations of the complaint
the plaintiff may have sought to foreclose its mortgage
on any GO acres or shares of water right owned by R. H.
Spencer.
Much of the controversy in the court below centered
around certificates numbered 72 and 78. 'l'he facts relating to these certificates show: On either .Tune 1, 1918
or Nov. 2:J, ] 931, Richard H. Spencer and Annie Spencer
attempted to convey 160 shares of Class "A" stock to
the Tndianola Irrigation Company. (See Indianola Irrigation Company FJxhihit 5) The acknowledgment of the
notary sa~Ts that Richard H. Spencer and Annie Spencer,
his wife, together with a nmnher of others acknowledged
the conve~1 ance on .Tune 1, 1918. There is some evidence
that the conveyance was actually made on N ovemher 25,
1931. (See Tr. 267) It of course may he that R. H. Spencer executed the instrument twice, that is to say, his
original Hignature may have become detached from the
original instrument so that it became necessary to have
Mr. Spencer sign again.
'

I
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It would he a very dangerous precedent to set by
our courts to say that an acknowledgment of an instrument which appears regular on its face f'hould he held
for nought by the statement of a witness testifying after
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the lapse of 16 years that the witness signed at a later
date. 'i'he most that can possibly be said for such testimony is that it carries an inference that it was not signed
before. It will further be noted that a red ink line is
drawn through the words: "dated this 25th day of
November, 19i31.'' Such lines were drawn through the
instrument when it was recorded. (See Tr. 43) It would
seem that the only possible reason for drawing the red
ink line through the date was to indicate that there was
something wrong with the date. If the acknowledgment
shows the instrument was actually orignally signed on
the date of the acknowledgment the way to make that
evident would be to strike out as was done the words:
''dated this 25th day of November, 1931.''
\Vhatever the fact may be in such particular we do
not, in the light of other facts appearing in the evidence,
deem it of special importance.

1t will be seen that the deed, Indianola Irrigation
Company Exhibit 5, does not describe any particular
water right conveyed or intended to be conveyed to the
company. It would have been a simple matter for the one
who drew the deed to have designated the particular
water right that was intended to he conveyed hy describing the land to which it was appurtenant. If that had
heen done this litigation wo~:Ild prohahly not have arisen.
So long as deeds are drawn which do not meet the requirements of the law with respect to the description of the
property conveyed, confusion and 'litigation is almost
certain to follow.
We, therefore, contend that the deed which Spencer
made to the Indianola Irrigation Company is void for
uncertainity in that an attempt was made to convey to
the company a part of a larger number of acres of water
without placing in the instrument of conveyance any
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information whatever which could identify the property
intended to be conveyed.
In connection with what we have said about the
necessity of conveyance being certain and definite we
direct the attention of the court to U. C. A. 1943-100-1-11
wherein it is provided that: "water rights shall he transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real
estate." But assuming that some water right was conveyed to the Irrigation Company how stands the case7
In case numbered 2888 and in this case the defendant
Indianola Irrigation Company sought to have certificates
numbered 72 and 73 cancelled because it claimed that
Richard Spencer had secured the issuance of such
certificates by representing that he had that amount of
stock free and clear of encumberances. We shall presently
point out in detail the facts in such particular. For the
present if it he assumed that certificates numbered 72
and 73 were subject to cancellation and that the court
properly cancelled such certificates in this action it
necessarily follows that the water right represented by
such certificates is and has been appurtenant to the land
upon which the water was and has been used since long
before the organization of the irrigation company. So far
as we are advised the adjudicated cases and the text
writers are agreed that when a contract is rescinded the
parties thereto are placed in the same position as they
were in before the contract was entered into. The law is
thus stated in 12 Am . .Jur., page 1031, Sec. 451:
''The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be restored on both sides. Releasing one party from
his part of the agreement and excusing him from
making the other party whole do not seem agreeable to reason or justice. Hence, the general rule
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is that a party who wishes to rescind an agreement
must place the opposite party in status quo.''
rrhe results are the same regardless of the reasons
for making the reseision. Thus in its final analysis it is
not of controlling importance whether the transaction
whereby Spencer executed a purported deed to the company for certificates 72 and 7:3 which purported deed is
void for uncertainty hecause not describing the water
right attempted to be conveyed or whether the transaction
is set aside heeause of misrepresentation made by Spencer. In either event the water right is appurtenant to the
land. That is to say the water right would be the
same as if no deed of conveyance had been made or attempted to he made. F'rom what has heen said, however,
we do not concede the evidence shows that Speneer made
any misrepresentations touching the number of unenrumhered shares of stock he had when he made a deed to
the company. 'l'he evidence shows the follows:
Spem~er

mortgage to the Federal Building and Loan
As:soeiation was not for 28;) slmres or acres of water
hut 22:~ acres. (See Indianola Irrigation Company's
exhibit 1) He made a mortgage to Hugentohler for G5
acres. There were ~) acres appurtenant to a small a tract
of Janel conveyed. Add to this the lGO acres of water
which \vas attempted to be conve.ved to the company we
have a total of 441 acres. 'l'here is some evidence that a
water rig1Jt was allocated to the cemetery lot and we
have heretofore directed the attention of the court to
the testimony to the effect that U. H. Spencer, at one
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time, used some water on a tract of Indian land, the deed
to wliich he lost. ('Jlr. 390) It will be seen that all of the
448 acres of water is accounted for, except the 60 acres
claimed by the plaintiff.
rrhere is nothing in the mortgage to indicate whether
it is a first or a second mortgage. It does appear that the
bank was out to get all the security that Spencer had
available.
1f nch of the difficulty that the Indianola Irrigation
Company finds itself in is due to the fact that it gave to
the F'ederal Building and Loan Association 285 shares
of stock and now seeks to claim that Richard H. Spencer
was responsible therefor when in truth and in fact the
difficulty was apparently brought about by the company
having issued certificates of stock to H. M. Spencer (the
sons of R. H. Spencer and one of the mortgagors of the
property mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan
Association) which stock H. M. Spencer mortgaged to
the Commercial Bank of Spanish l~'ork. 'L'he Company
then made a second issue of stock for the same water
right to the Federal Building and Loan Association. The
Indianola Irrigation Company is now apparently quite
willing to have the decree in this case award to plaintiff
\Vhittaker 60/1728 and to Hugentobler 55/1728 of all the
class '' B '' water rights of its stockholders notwithstanding there is not one scintilla of evidence to justify such
an award. We say that because it is reasonable to assume
that the Indianola Irrigation Company took part in
formulating the decree in this case. Be that as it may it
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has not yet raised its voice in protest against the obvious
fact that both Whittaker and Hugentobler have been
awarded more water than they are entitled to, namely:
60/1728 and 55/1728, not only of class "A" water rights
but also of the class "B" water of Thistle Creek and its
tributaries.
Plaintiff also claims that the Spencers may not prevail in their attack on his title to the sixty shares because:
1. Both Richard H. Spencer and John Edison
Spencer have in the present action disclaimed any interest to the water right in controversy.

2. That by reason of the judgment rendered in case
2888 the matter of ownership of the right to the sixty
shares has been adjudicated.
As to plaintiff's claim that R. H. Spencer and John
E~dison Spencer have disclaimed any interest in the water
in dispute in the present case the pleadings filed herein
show that the water right claimed by the plaintiff was
to the right to the use of water to irrigate 60 acres of
land in Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian. (See paragraph 14 of complaint R.
7 and 8)
To the complaint John Edison Spencer and Richard

H. Spencer filed their motion to strike on various
grounds: Among the portions of the complaint so sought
to be stricken were the first 11 lines of paragraph 14.
(R. 41-44)
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Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer also
filed a demurrer to the complaint on various grounds,
among them being that it could not be ascertained from
the complaint what water right the plaintiff claimed and
particularly that it could not be ascertained from said
complaint what particular land in Section 3, if any, the
alleged water of the plaintiff was ever used.
The demurrer was upon the ground that plaintiff's
claim to a water right was barred by various provisions
of the statute of limitation. (J.R. 48-49) The disclaimer
upon which plaintiff relies reads 'as follows:
''Comes now Richard H. Spencer and John
Edison Spencer (spelled John Edson Spencer in
plaintiff's complaint) each for himself and not
one for the other and for answer to plaintiff's
complaint alleges:
Defendants disclaim all right, title or interest
of whatsoever character or extent, in or to any
and all of the premises and water rights described
in plaintiff's complaint and especially that particular alleged water right described in paragraph
VIV of plaintiff's complaint."
Larson and Larson
Attorneys for the defendants
Richard H. Spencer and John
Edison Spencer.
The answer and disclaimer is verified by R. H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer. (J.R. 52-53 and 54)
It would seem clear from the pleadings above referred to and quoted that the subject matter therof was
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water used for the irrigation of Section 3 and no other.
It could not be said to refer to the water right represented by certificates 72 or 73 because the same were
not mentioned or referred to in the pleadings of the
plaintiff nor were the same mentioned in the decree of
foreclosure.
l\f oreover the plaintiff could not well have claimed

any rights to the waterright represented by certificates
84 or 86 because the water right represented by such
certificates come out of the water right which was foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association's
proceeding in which proceeding W. H. Hadlock, John A.
1\falia, state bank commissioner of Utah, for the use and
benefit of the creditors of the North Sanpete Bank, a
corporation, were parties defendants and were foreclosed
from making any claim to the water appurtenant to the
land and water right which was appurtenant to the land
covered by their mortgage, including the 223 acres of
water which R. H. Spencer mortgaged to that corporation. The Indianola Irrigation Company was also a defendant in such action and any right that it might have
to the water covered by the Federal Building and Loan
Association's mortgage was likewise cut off and disposed
of. It thus remained for the plaintiff and the Indianola
Irrigation Company to seek some means to get at certificates numbered 72 and 73 to make up for their failure
to appear in the foreclosure proceeding of the Federal
Building and Loan Association and defend such rights
as they might have to the water right there involved.
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As we have repeatedly said there is not a scintilla
of evidence in this case which shows or tends to show
that the plaintiff ever had or at any time prior to the
present proceeding even claimed any right to certificates
numbered 72 or 73 or to the water right which was appurtenant to the lands in section 5 to which such water right
was appurtenant. We repeat that such results were
brought about because the mortgage given to Hadlock,
Bank Commissioner and the deed given to the Irrigation
Company were so vague and uncertain that no one could
ascertain from the language used therein what water
right was intended to be mortgaged or conveyed. It is because of the results that followed in the wake of such a
method of attempting to convey mortgaged property that
the courts have uniformly held that the same are void. In
this connection it should be noted that at the time John
Edison Spencer made the disclaimer he had every reason
to believe and did believe that the title to the water right
represented by certificates numbered 72 and 73 belonged
to Price. (Tr. 599 et seq.)
The plaintiff has pleaded res judicata and an estoppel as against both the administrator and John Edison
Spencer and in his reply plaintiff's counsel in the court
below argued such questions at considerable length at the
conclusion of the trial. Of course if the mortgage given to
Hadlock, the decree of foreclosure and the deeds to the
Bank Commissioner and to Spencer are valid there can
be no doubt but that the Spencers are estopped from
asserting any claim to the water right disposed of in
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such proceeding and the conveyances made in pursuance
thereof. We have not and shall not contend to the contrary. On the other hand if the mortgage given by R. H.
Spencer to the bank on 60 shar:es or acres of water right
and the proceedings had to foreclose the same or the
deeds given ofter the mortgage was foreclosed are so
uncertain and ambiguous in the matter of describing the
subject matter as to .render the same void then and in
such case the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata have
no application. We will be interested in having counsel
for plaintiff cite a case or other authority where it is
held that a void decree or document may work either on
estoppel or be aided by res judicata. \Ve understand the
law to be that a void instrument is wholly without legal
effect for any purpose.
It will also be noted that by the decree entered in
this case a cloud is cast upon all of the water rights of
'l'histle Creek and its tributaries. It does not describe
any water right by either reference to certificates of
stock or by a description of the land to which it is appurtenant. Any one purchasing or taking any of the
water rights of 'rhistle Creek will be unable to ascertain
what particular water right is awarded to plaintiff. The
fact that plaintiff is unable to identify his claimed water
right doeH not entitle him to a decree clouding all the
water rights in Thistle Creek.

In connection with the water right claimed by the
plaintiff the court's attention is again called to the deed
which Richard H. Spencer gave to John Edison Spencer
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m September of 1933 (See John Edison Spenoor's Exhibit 12) and the fact that he has been in possession of
that property, together with the water right used thereon
since that time and it is reasonable to assume that he has
paid the taxes on such land, together with the water used
to irrigate the same ever since the same was conveyed to
him. This action was not brought until July 21, 1941,
more than seven years after John Edison Spencer received the conveyance above mentioned, which it will be
observed conveyed to him 80 acres of water right in
Thistle Creek. It wiH also be noted that John Edison
Spencer did not sign the mortgage which plaintiff
sought to foreclose in cause numbered 2888. Under such
a state of the record the plaintiff has lost any right to the
water used upon the land which land and water right was
so conveyed to John Edison Spencer. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-4
and Hammond vs. Johnson 94 Ut. 20; 66 P. (2d) 894.
•John Edison Spencer held and used both the land and
water adversely to the plaintiff and its claimed grantor
or mortgagor, Hichard H. Spencer, for more than the
statutory period.
It will be noted that the trial court awarded judgment against .John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A.
Tibbs jointly and severally in favor of the plaintiff for
costs taxed at $75.80, (J.R. 273) and likewise awarded
judt,'"Inent in favor of the defendant Indianola Irrigation
Company, a corporation, and against John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs jointly and severally costs
taxed at $154.40. We have assigned such awards as er-
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ror. (Assignments 42 and 45.) We are at a loss to understand upon what theory such an award was made. If
eosts have any relation whatsoever to the degree of fault
that the party has been guilty of in an action certainly
if there was fauJt it was primarilythe fault of Richard
H. Spencer. So far as Elizabeth A. Tibbs is concerned
she was an onlooker. If any costs should be awarded
(which we contend it sholl'ld not be) in favor of either the
plaintiff or the Indianola Irrigation Company we submit
that it should be against the administrator and not
against either John Edison Spencer or Elizabeth A.
Tibbs.
rl'HE WATER RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS CON-

TROVEHSY ARE APPURTENANT TO LANDS
OWNED BY JOHN EDISON SPENCER AND ELIZABETH A. TIBBS.
The trial court found that the water rights claimed
by John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs are not
appurtenant to the lands conveyed to them by Richard H.
Spencer. We have assigned such finding as error in assi.L,rnments numbered 17 and 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27.
Whether or not water represented by stock m a
mutual irrigation company is appurtenant to land so
that it will pass with a deed to the land as an appurtenance is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The
mere fact that water is represented by stock certificates in
a ~ater company is in no sense controlling. The question
was first before our Utah Supreme Court in 1898 in the
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case of Smith vs. North Canyon Wa.t,er Company, 16 Ut.
194. The court there held that water represented by
stock in a water company was under the facts of that
case appurtenant to the land in question. The court has
consistent!ly from that date forward treated the problem
as a fact question and as recently as October of 1945
reaffirmed the rule that water represented by stock in a
water company could in law be appurtenant to the land
upon which the water was used. See Milford State Bank
vs. West Field Canal & Irr. Co., 100 Utah 528, 162 P. 2d.
101. The Utah cases have never treated the fact that the
water was represented by the stock in a corporation as
controlling.
In the Milford State Bank vs. West Field Carnal &
lrr. Co., c:ase, supra, the owner of the land had conveyed
it by instruments placed in escrow, together with all
water and water rights thereunto be'longing. By inadvertence a certificate purpoting to represent 49 shares of
water in a corporation was deposited in escrow with the
land contract. The seller contended that only a portion
( 28 shares) of the 49 had ever been used on the land and
argued that all that was conveyed by the agreement was
the land and the water which was appurtenant thereto.
The Supreme Court adopted this view and said: (p. 536
of the Utah reports).
''The record is sufficient to sustain the finding that Blackner bought the lands from Mrs.
Daker with the appurtenant water right: that the
appurtenant water right was 28 shares of the
capitol stock of the irrigation company on the
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basis of one share of stock to each acre of land.
Shares of stock of an irrigation company issued
in place of the vested water right for lands in an
irrigation district are appurtenant unless they
have been transferred and put to a beneficial use
upon other lands.''
The court had a like problem before it in Ea~t
River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 P.
2d. 277, (1942). There had been a duplicate issue of seven
shares of water stock in the plaintiff company. This
duplicate issue was represented by a stock certificate
which had been pledged to a bank as security for a loan.
Suit was brought by the irrigation company to have the
duplicate issue declared void. The bank defended on the
grounds that it was a bona fide purchaser without notice.
The Supreme Court decided against the bank holding that
the water in the irrigation company was still appurtenant
to the land and charged the bank with notice of this fact.
'l'he court said:
"The corporation was a loose sort of a mutual agreement for the unified management and
distribution of the water to the owners. The
limited and restrictive words for the purpose of
'control, management and distribution' is not a
conveyance separating a water right from the
land does not vest title or the right of use in the
corporation within the provisions of Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Section 100-1-10 and Section
100-1-1. .. The water right was never severed
from the land and is still appurtenant thereto."
The best discussion of this problem in the Utah
cases is contained in Re: Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114,
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228 P. 748, (1924). There, by will, a testator devised
specified lands to certain of his children. The remaining
children were named as the residual legatees. In the
devise of the land the testator failed to mention water
rights for the land. The water was represented by stock
in a corporation and during his life the water represented by this stock had been used on the lands specifically
devised. The residual legatees contended that the stock
was personal property and came to them as a part of the
residue of the estate. The other children, to whom the
land had been devised, contended that the stock was
appurtenant to the land devised and passed with it as an
appurtenance even though the will had failed to mention
it. The Supreme Court held that the water was appurtenant. The problem of water represented by stock in a
corporation being appurtenant to land was discussed in
some detail. The court said:
''Appellants, claiming the 44 remaining
shares of water stock as an appurtenant to tract
A of the real estate, prayed for its distribution to
them. It was alleged and not denied that the water
right was used in connection with the land, and
that the land is of little or no value without the
water right. The trial court found that the water
right had been used for the irrigation of the lands
owned by the testator, but that notwithstanding
such use the same was personal property, and
was not included in the devise to appellants. The
question is whether a water right so owned and
used will pass by the devise, without mention, with
the land as an appurtenance ... " (then followed
citation of and quotations from the statutes which
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were what are now sections 100-1-10 and 100-1-11,
U.C.A. 1943)
Hcferring to what is now section 100-1-10 which provides
in part:
''Water rights shall be transferred by deeds
in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of
stock in a corporation . · "
1'he court said:
''The latter provisiOn is obviously intended
for the conveyance of water rights in cases where
the water rights are severed from the land upon
which the water has been used, and separately
conveyed. In such a case if the water right is
represented by shares of stock in a corporation,
the plain implication is that it may be transferred
by a transfer of the certificate of stock, in the
ordinary manner, as personal property. But that
does not necessarily mean that water rights thus
represented may not be an appurtenance to the
land upon which the water is used, and pass as
such with a conveyance of the land."
The court then quoted with approval from Weil on
vVater Rights, 3d. l~d. Sec. 1269 (which is quoted below
in this brief under heading "Text Writers", and also
cited with approval cases from Washington, Idaho and
California, and distinguished an earlier Utah case which
while using some language indicating a different view
is not in conflict with the other Utah cases. It was then
::-;tated that whether water represented by stock is appurtenant is a fact question. The court went on to con-
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elude that under the facts of that case the water rights
represented by water stock were appurtenant to the lands
devised. Said the court :
''The right to the use of water for irrigation
is inseparately related to land. Without its continued use upon land the right ceases. The customary practical presumption is that water rights
used upon lands are appurtenant to and a part of
it ... "
"Upon principle and authority we conclude
that the water right referred to passed by the will
as an appurtenance to the land selected by the
executor, and that the same should be distributed
to the appellants with the land."
Other Utah cases have touched Qn the problem. In
1898 it was presented to the court in Smith vs. Nlorth
Canyon. Wat1er Co., 16 Utah 194. There a deed to lands
failed to mention water. 'l'he water in question was represented by stock. The court held that the water passed
with the land as an appurtenance.
In Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 93. Utah 236, land
owners exchanged their water for canal water from the
private canal of Salt Lake City. The contention was that
the water was made personal property because reduced
'to possession by the city in its canal. The court held that
even though so reduced to possession in a private canal
the water was still appurtenant to the land because it was
used thereon in exchange for waters that had been appurtenant. No stock in a corporation was involved, but
the case is helpful because it is generally held that water,

8~)

reduced to possession in a private canal, is personal property. Yet the court held that the water was an appurtenant (real property) because of its use and the nature of
the exchange agreement.
In Genol,a Town vs. Swntaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80
P. 2d 930 the court noted the peculiar nature of ownership of stock in a mutual irrigation company. It said:
(page 101)
"Stock in a mutual company entails the right
to demand such stockholders aliquot share of the
water in proportion as his stock holding bears to
all the stock. Water rights are pooled in a mutual
company for convenience of operation and more
efficient distribution, and perhaps for more convenient transfer. But the stock certificate is not
like the stock certificate in a company operated
for profit. It is really a certificate showing an
undivided part ownership in a certain water supply. It embraces the right to call for such undivided part according to the method of distribution.''
To the same effect see Smithfield vs. Union Central Life,
105 Utah 468.
In Fisher vs. Bovumtiful City, 21 Ut:ah 29, plaintiffs
and others associated together under the name of Barton
Creek Irrigation Company. Bountiful sought to control
and manage the distribution of their water rights. At
page 34 of the Utah reports the court held that the rights
of the plaintiffs were appurtenant to their lands. It does
not clearly appear, except from the name of the company,
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whether or not the water rights were represented by
stock.
In Woolley 1:s. Dowse, 86 Utah 221, it wa~ held that
the water in question wa~ not appurtenant to land which
had been mortgaged. The holding was placed on the
grounds that the water was not in fact used on the land
rather than upon the ground~ that it was stock in a
mutual company. The fact that the holding was put on
the ground~ that it wa~ not appurtenant in fact because
not used on the land rather than on the fact that it was
stock in a mutual company shows that the court did not
consider that fact to be controlling.
In Geo.rge v. Robinson, 23 Ut. 79, the court held the
water there involved was not apputtenant. The suit was
for breach of warranty. Plaintiff was grantee under a
deed conveying land and appurtenances. Thereafter defendant lost use of the water and sued for breach of
warranty. The water was represented by stock in an
irrigation company. In holding that the water was not
appurtenant to the land the court noted various things
which it apparently con~idered to be important in arriving at that conclusion. lt said:
"In fact, the fair result of plaintiff's own
testimony is to the effect that the water of Corn
Creek, of which that in dispute is a part, is and
was owned by the corporation; that each share
of ih; capital stock represented sufficient water to
irrigate one acre of land; and that stockholders
only were entitled to water for purposes of irrigation. There is nothing to show that any parti-
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cular share of stock represented any water for
any particular land. So far as appears from the
proof, each stockholder had the right to use the
water to which he was entitled on any land he
saw fit. Under such arrangements ... the water
cannot be appurtenant."
lt further appears in that case that the grantor in the
deed did not own any water and the grantee knew that
sueh was the fact. Again the court failed to place the
holding on the fact that the water was represented by
stock. It reasoned as to whether it was appurtenant
in fact and based its holding on the conclusion that it
was not. Any language in the case indicating that water
in a water eompany could not be appurtenant to land
was overruled by the later opinion of In Re Johnson's
Estate, supra, where George v. Robinson is expressly
noted.
1'here is not a single Utah case which was disclosed
hy our search where the court has held that water in
a water corporation cannot in law be appurtenant to land.
1'he cases uniformly treat the matter as question of fact.

\VHEN IS WA'l'ER APPURTENANT1
lf it be accepted, as well it must, that water represented by stock may or may not be appurtenant to land
depending upon whether or not it is appurtenant in fact,
then our problem· is to determine when water is appurtenant. This is am;wered in the case of Thompson v.

McKinney, 91 Ut. 89, 63 P. 2d 1056. The suit was an action to quiet title to lands and waters claimed to be
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appurtenant thereto. The question was whether or not
certain waters were in fact appurtenant to certain lands.
Tl1e water was not represented by stock in a corporation.
The court discussed many cases dealing with the question of when water is appurtenant in fact. The court
rejected the contention that only those waters which
were "indispensable" to the use of land were appurtenant. It quoted with approval from 2 Kinney on Irr.
and \Vater Rights, (2d Ed.), Sec. 1011, p. 1904 as follows:
"r.l'he doctrine is well settled in the States of
the arid region, that a water right used in connection with a certain tract of land for the irrigation
thereof, where necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land, together with the ditch, canal,
or other works necessary to conduct the water to
the place of use, become appurtenances to the
land provided they are all owned by the same
parties.''
This idea of being owned by the same parties is not
in conflict with the concept that water represented by
stock can be appurtenant because of the holding in cases
such as East River Bottom v. Boyce, supra, 102 Utah
149, supra, and Genola Town v. Santaquin, 96 Utah 88,
supra, holding that the owner of the stock certificate
is in fact an owner in common with the other stockholders
of the water. The same concept formed the basis of a
later opinion by the Supreme Court in Smithfield W.
Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Ut.
468, 142 P. 2d 866. The court there said:
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''The waters of a mutual irrigation company belong to the users, the company being the
mere distributing and apportioning trustee . . .
The Company cannot sell any of the water without
consent of the stockholders or for nonpayment
of dues if the articles of incorporation make the
stock liable for such costs and expenses. Likewise the company cannot permit the water to be
lost by non-use thereof as long as any shareholder desires to and is in a position to use the
water. Water undistributed may be used by any
stockholder in a position to use it. The shareholders are in effect owners in common of the
waters with certain limitations as , between one
another governing the use thereof.'' Citing many
cases.
In the Thompson v. McKinney case, supra, the court
also quoted with approval from a Montana case Lensing
v. Day, 67 Mont. :182, 215 P. 999, as follows:
"A water right, acquired by appropriation
and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose
in connection with a given tract of land, is an
appurtenance thereto, and as such passes with
the conveyance of the land unless expressly reserved from the grant."
It must be concluded that whenever water is appropriated for use on particular lands and is so used
thereon for beneficial purposes it becomes appurtenant
to that land. For other cases discussing the problem
of when water becomes appurtenant to land see Kinney,
Water Rights, 2d Ed., Sec. 1005-1016; Connant v. Deep
Creek & Curlow Valley Irr. Co., 23 Ut. 627, 66 P. 188;
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Utah .Metal & 'runnel Company v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah
251, 219 P. 248.
Once it is established that the water is in fact appurtenant to land (and this is always a question of fact)
then the cases are numerous holding that it passes with
a conveyanee of the land without being mentioned in the
deed of conveyance. In Black v. Johnson, 81 Utah 410,
it was held that tax deed conveying lands sold for taxes
carried with it "one city lot of water right" even though
not mentione(l in the tax deed. In Thompson v. M ciCinn,ey, 91 Ut. 89, 6~~ P. 2d 105G it was held that a mortgage
on lands also mortgaged the water which was appurtenant to it even though no mention of the water was
made in the mortgage. See also the recent case of Petrofesa v. Rio Gra;nde R. R Co., 110 Utah------, 169 P. 2d 808
decided in .June, 1946; Anderson v. Hanson, ;)0 Utah 149,
167 P. 254; LeBCie v. Smith, 64 Ut. 242, 229 P. 88.

'rl1JXT\VRITEHS ALL HOLD '1_1HAT WATER RBJPRB~SENTED BY STOCK IN A MU'L'UAL COMPANY
CAN BE AND OFTPJN IS APPUR'l'FJNANT TO LAND
AND THAT IN J;jACH CAS I~ Fr IS A QUFJSTTON
OF FACT.
The writers of text hooks on water right::; all agree
with the Utah cases above cited that water represented
by stock in a mutual company can be and often is appurtenant to the land upon which used. Whether it is
or

IS

not in each case is a question of fact. Quotation

from W eil, the leading writer on western water law is
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representative of the pervailing legal thought on this
matter.
In W eil on Wat<er Ri.ghts Section 1269, (cited with
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Tn re: .Johnson's
Estate, 64 Ut. 114) it is stated:
''So long as the company remains purely
a mutual one, the certificate of stock represents
the water right. A transfer or sale of the certifteate is governed by much the same rules as those
elsewhere considered regarding transfers of
water rights. Whether the water right is an appurtenance to the stockholders land is a question of fact in each case, as is also whether on
a sale of the land the water right passes as an
appurtenance. A sale of the certificate may be
made separate from the land for use on other
land and will transfer the water right ... On the
other hand in the absence of any separate sale
of the certificate or of any other evidence of any
express intention to make a severance, a sale of
the land on which the water is used will carry the
water right and the right to the certificate as an
appurtenance.''
The section is also cited with approval in lkrq

1'.·

Yakima

C. Co., 83 Wash. 451, 145 P. 619.
In Kinney on lrrigati·on and Water Rights, Sec. 1484,
the rule is stated that water represented by stock in a
water company generally is not appurtenant. He, however, cites cases from California holding in accord with
the Utah rule and the rule stated by Weil.
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Hu,tchirngs, Selected Problems of the Law of Water
Rights in the West, p. 385 cites Weil with approval for
proposition that appurtenancy is a question of fact.

CASES FOR MOTHER STATES:
1tVestern states uniformly hold that water represented by stock in a mutual company may he and often
is appurenant to land.

CALIFORNIA: In Re: Thomas Estate, 147 Cal.
236, 81 P. 539, it was ·held that the conveyance of land
by the original owner of a water right which was appurtenant to a certain tract of land to a mutual water
corporation, for the better management and distribution
of the water, did not segregate the water from the land
as such appurtenance, but merely changed its form; and,
hence under the Civil Code, Section 1311, providing that
every devise of land conveys all the estate of the devisor,
and therefore, that a devise of land carried with it the
share of stock in the company as appurtenant to the land;
and therefore, it was entirely proper for the trial court
to direct a transfer of stock to the devisee.
COLORADO: Denv,er Joint Land Bank v. Markham, 107 P. 2d 313: Here the Court said:
"Where the water right is appurtenant to
the stockholder's land is a question of fact, as
is also whether, on a sale or transfer of the land,
the water right passes as an appurtenance * • •
The doctrine which makes it a question of fact
whether the water right is appurtenant to the
land and whether it passes by a lease or other
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conveyance seems to us sound." (Citing other
Colorado cases.)

Comstock v. Olney Sp·ring & Drain.age Dist., Colo. 50 P.
2d 531.
'' * * * where the company is a mutual irrigation company, or as here, a mutual reservoir
company, organized, not for profit, but for the
convenience of its members in the management
of the irrigation system and in the distribution
to them of water upon their lands * * * ownership of shares of stock in the corporation is but
incidental to ownership of water right, which
is appurtenant to the land upon which the water
is used ..''
IDAHO: Ireton
P. fi87, 689:

1'.

idaho Irr. Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164

Action to foreclose real estate mortgage. It
denied that the water right, represented by stock,
real property appurtenant to the land and argued
it was not covered by the mortgage on the land.
court held to the contrary stating:

was
was
that
The

''While this court has held shares in an
irrigation company to be personal property the
faet must not be lost sight of that a water right
is, as heretofore shown, real estate, and that in
case of a mutual irrigation company, not organized for profit, but for the convenience of its
members in the management of the irrigation
system and in the distribution to them of water
for use upon their lands in proportion to their
stock in the corporation is but incidental to the
ownership of water right. Such shares are muni-
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ments of title to the water right, are inseparable
from it and ownership of them passes with title
which ·they evidence.''
~:1

\¥ ASHINCVrON: Berg v. Yak:ima Valley Canal Oo.,
Wash. 451, 145 P. 619:

The question involved was whether or not water
rights represented by stock certificates passed with a
lease of lands. 'Jlhe contention was made that they were
not appurtenant and would not pass as an appurtenance. 'l'he court held to the contrary stating:
'' ln a mutual company the stock certificate
represents the water right. A transfer or sale of
the certificate may be made separate from the
land for use on other land, and will transfer the
water right. But where it has not been thus sold
or transferred, the question whether the water
right is appurtenant to the stockholder's land
is generally a question of fact, as is also whether,
on a sale or transfer of the land, the water right
pass as an appurtenance * * * In the present case
the water was appurtenant to the land."

:MONTANA: See Yellowstone ValLsy Co. vs. Associated M ortga.ge Investors, Inc., et al. 88 M ant. 73, 290
P. 255.
FEDEJRAL: Ack'royd vs. Winst:on, 113 Fed. 2nd
G57. This case arose under the laws of the State of Montana and the Circuit Court discusses cases from several
western states including Utah and concludes that water
represented by stock in a mutual company can be and
is often appurtenant to land. It also holds that whether
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it is appurtenant in a particular case is a question of fact.
THE INDIANOLA IRRIGATION COMPANY IS A
MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY
Article 6 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Inrlianola Irrigation Company provides:
"The purpose for which this corporation is
formed and the pursuit and business to be engaged in is to manage, regulate, control and distribute the waters of Thistle Creek, its branches
to and among its stockholders in proportion to
their and each of their respective rights to the use
thereof, to construct and maintain all such dams,
ditches, canals, gates, reservoirs, flumes and
other and different structures and means which
may be found necessary or convenient for irrigation and other purposes.''
rt will thus be seen that the corporation was not, by its
articles, authorized to own the water in its systems but
only to manage, regulate, control and distribute the
waters, under the doctrine announcer! in the case of
I~ast River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, et al, supra,
from which we have quoterl, the water under the Indianola Irrigation Company was appurtenant to the land
of its stockholders. The water represented by certificates of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company, is,
as a matter of law, appurtenant to the land upon which
~uch water has been and is being used.
In the case of East River Bottom Water Co. vs.
Boyce, et al, it will be noted that the majority opinion
holds that a water right is not severed from being
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appurtenant to land where the corporation is merely
given the right to manage and control the water. It may
or may not be that this court judicially or personally
knows that when that case was decided many of the
banks throughout the state that had loaned money on
certificates of stock in irrigation companies became
alarmed because under the doctrine of that case their
security might become valueless. Be that as it may at
the next session of the legislature following the rendering of that opinion the let,>"islature amended Section
U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-10 so that the same should provide
as follows:
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed
in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of
stock in a corporation, in which case water shall
not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land, and
such deeds shall be recorded in books kept for
that purpose in the office of the recorder of the
county where the place of diversion of the water
from its natural channel is situated and in the
county where the water is applied. Every deed of
a water right so recorded shall, from the time
of filing the same with the recorder for record
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof
and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien
holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with
notice thereof." Laws of Utah 1943, Chapter 105,
page 154.
The language in italics was added by the amendment of 1943. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-ll was not amended.

It remained as it had been and provides as follows:
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"A right to the use of water appurtenant to
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, and, in
oases where such right has been exercised in irrigating different parcels of land at different times,
such right shall pass to the grantee of any parcel of land on which such right was exercised
next preceeding the time of the execution of any
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases
to payment by the grantee in any such conveyance
of all amounts unpaid on any assessment then due
upon any such right, provided, that any such
. right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may
be reserved by the grantor in any such conveyance by making such reservation in express terms
in such conveyance, or it may be separately conveyed.''
THljJ Al\HJNDMENT TO SECTION 100-1-10, U.C.A.
1943, ~fADI~ BY THE 1943 LEGISLATURJ<J DOES
NOT HAVE TH:BJ EFFECT OF MAKING \VATER
·wHICH WAS IN FACT APPURTENAN'l, TO LAND,
NOT APPURTENANT.
There can be no doubt that from earliest times the
courts of this state and territory have held that water
represented by stock in an irrigation company may be
and usually is appurt.enant to the lands upon which the
water is used. Mutual companies were organized throuout the west for the purpose of distributing and managing the water of the corporate members, such is the expressed purpose of the incorporators of the Indianola
Irrigation Company. It has been uniformly held that the
stockholders are tenants in· common of the water. See
Smithfield West Field lrr. Co. vs. Union Cen,tral Life,
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105 Utah 468; Genola Town vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah
88, 80 P. 2d 9i30. Certainly no farmer in turning over to a
mutual company the right to distribute and manage his
water ever intended to sever the water from the land. The
Utah eases cited above all recognize this when they hold
that water represented by stock is nevertheless still appurtenant to the land upon which used. As will be hereinafter shown the legislature could not change the nature
of the contract made by the stockholders among themselves in their articles without running afoul of the constitutional limitation which prohibits the ,impairment of
the obligation of contract. This should be kept in mind in
approaching the problem of the construction of section
100-1-10, as amended by the laws of 1943, wherein it is
provided that water represented by stock in a corporation shall not be deemed appurtenant to land.

The word ''deemed'' has been given two well recognized meanings by the authorities and the one which is to
be adopted in any particular instance depends upon the
context. The two meanings are recognized by the standard law dictionaries. In 9 American and English Enc.
165 it is defined as follows:
'''Do deem means to judge ; to determine
upon consideration; to form a judgn1en t; to conclude upon consideration. The term is also used
in the ordinary sense ·Of to think to suppose; to
hold opinion.''
This same definition is cited in Bou:nier, New Law
Dictionary, 1934. See also Webster, New Inte.rnational
Dictionary, which is as follows:
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'' l. To pass judgment; to render decision;
to aet as judge or arbitor .

•

2. To have an opinion, to judge, believe, suppose * * "
In 13 Cyc. 756 the term is defined as to adjudge and
also to suppose, to believe, to think.
CASH~S

RAISI~

HOLDING 'l'HAT TH11J vVOHDS
"SHALL BE D~~J<JMED"

ONLY A

RJ,~BUTrPABLJ<~

PRESUMPTION

Miller 'VS. Commonwealth, 2 S.E. 2d, 34:~, 172
Va. G3D. Statute providing that liquor in containers not bearing the re(1uired government stamps
shall he deemed to have been illegally acquired,
created a presumption subject to being overcome
by opposing evidence rather than a conclusive
presumption.
In re Barbour's Estate: 173 N.Y.S. 280, 185
App. Div. 445. A tax statute provided that every
person ''shall be deemed'' to have died a resident
of New York upon living in N.Y. the greater part
of any 12 consecutive months in the 24 months
next preceding his death. Held this merely raised
a presumption which could be overcome by proof
that decedent was not in fact a resident.
Kleepe vs. Odin tp., McHenry County, N.D.
169 N.W. 313. Held that the language "and in
case the board having jurisdiction shall fail to
file such order within 20 days they shall be deemed
to have decided against such application'' raised
a rebuttable presumption "that can be overcome
with evidence to the contrary.''
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Cooper vs. Slaughter, 57 So. 477. Jury was
charged that if it believed that a boundary line,
the location of which was involved in the action,
was in dispute and that the adjoining owners
caused it to be established and acquiesced in the
line as established the plaintiff would be ''deemed'' the owners. Held that ''deemed'' as there
used was U1e equivalent of ''presumed.'' The appellant argued on appeal that the jury luid been
erroneously instructed that as a matter of law the
plaintiff would be the owner, because the word
deemed meant "considered" or "adjudged."
Bar.rell vs. Pittsburg, 62 Pa. St. 474. "But
after the death of the husband the wife's legal
settlement shall be deemed to be the place where
he was last legally settled. 'l1 his is equivalent to
the expression 'shall be taken to be' and admits
of the existence of a different state of facts,
namely, a settlement acquired by a widow herself.'' To the same effect see Miffin vs. Elizabeth
18 Pa. St. 17.
J,ackson vs. SuccessiJon, 47 La. Am. 1089. A
statute said that a legacy made to a creditor
should not be deemed to be in compensation of the
debt nor a legacy to a servant to be deemed to be
in payment of wages. The court said: "The word
deemed, used in the article simply means no
interpretation unfavorable to a creditor shall be
placed on the testament by the fact alone of the
legacy to the creditor. It is a question of interpretation.''
The above cases are representative of the many
cases holding that the lan!,'llage "shall be deemed"
raises only a prima facie presumption which is subject to
rebutal. In each of the above cases it had been argued
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McElroy 21 p. 2d, 80, 37 N. M. 238, it was held that where
a statute deems a thing denied it is adjudged denired.
From the above cases and dictionary definitions it
is clear that two distinct meanings have been given to the
term. 'l'he one meaning is that it but raised a prima
facie presumption or supposes a thing to be true. The
other considers the word to raise a conclusive presumption. ·which meaning is to be adopted in any particular
case depends upon ordinary rules of statutory construction. The word itself has no clear cut definite meaning
to be given in all cases. Clearly from the cases it is susceptible of more than one meaning. Whether in a given
case the presumption it raises is prima facie or conclusive cannot be answered merely by noting the use of the
word. Other rules of statutory construction must be used
because the word "deemed" has no set and definite
meaning. 1t is worthy of note that if the legislature had
intended the word "deemed" as conclusive there was no
occasion to use the word "deemed" at all. It could have
provided that water represented by shares of stock in a
corporation shall not be appurtenant to land. It did not
so provide, apparently because it did not so intend.
1

It will be noted that the provisions of U.C.A. 1943,
100-1-10 deals solely with a conveyance of a water right
independent of conveyance of land. The apparent purpose was to overcome any inference that may be drawn
from the East River Bottom case that a water right
represented by a certificate of stock could not be transferred by a transfer of the stock.
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OF THE TWO RECOGNIZJ1JD 1\LE~ANINGS FOR THE
'VOHD "DEEMED" THE COUHT IN CONSTRUING
THE 1943 l}MIDNDMEN'l' TO SECrrlON 100-1-10
?liUST HOLD THAT TT RAISES ONLY A PRIMA
FACHJ PHESUMPTTON.
It is universally recognized and established that the
articles of incorporation constitute a contract; (a) hetween the corporation and the state; (b) between the
corporation and the stockholders; (c) between the stockholders and the state; (d) between the state and third
persons who have dealt with the corporation on the
faith of the grant; (e) between the stockholders themselves. Thompson on Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, page
417. In Carey vs. Min. Co., 32Ut. 497, 91.P. 369, 12 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 554, it is said:
"The charter of a corporation having capital
stock is a contract between three parties and
forms the basis of three distinct contracts. The
charter is a contract between the state and the
corporation; second, it is a contract between the
corporation and the stockholders; third, it is a
contract between the stockholders and the state."
When the individual farmer joined a mutual corporation to distribute and manage his water, he did not contract, according to the existing Utah cases, to sever his
water from his land so t,hat it would no longer be appurtenant. His contract was of such a nature that the water
remained appurtenant even though represented by stock.
This was recognized by the case cited above including
two most recent Utah cases, East River Bottom vs. Boyce,
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102 Utah 149; 128 P. 2d 277, and Milford State Bank vs.
West Field Canal & Irr. Co., 108 Utah 528, 162 P. 2d, 101.
It is uniformly held by all the cases that a statute
which materially changes the contract made by the stockholders in the articles of incorporation is an impairment
of the obligation of contract within the meaning of the
constitutional limitations contained in both the state and
federal constitutions. See Fletche.r on Corporation, Vol.
7, Sec 3657; Garey vs. Mining Company, 32 Ut. 497, 91 P.
369, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 554; Superio'r Water, Light and
Power vs. Ci.ty of Superior, 263 U.S. 125, 68 L. Ed. 204,
44 S. Ct. 82.
If then it be admitted, as well it must, that many of
the mutual companies had articles which left the water
still appurtenant to the land upon which used, the legislature would have no constitutional power to enact a
statute which would impair this relationship and change
it by severing water which the stockholders had chosen
to leave appurtenant to land, from the land. That this
would be so is clearly demonstrated by our Utah Supreme
Court in the Carey vs. Mining Company case supra.
(There is much good language in this case. We quote
only a small portion of the discussion. Cases from many
states·are cited and quoted from):
''In the case of DMtmouth Colleg,e vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, it was
held that the charter from a state to a private
corporation created a contract within the meaning of the federal constitution, forbidding any
state to pass any law impairing the obligation of
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contracts, and hence the federal Constitution prevented a change by legislative enactment of a
charter so issued.''
"From the texts and the cases it will be seen
that under the reservation the state is not only
unathorized to alter or amend charters of existing
corporations in such a way as will change the
fundamental character of the corporation, impair
the object of the grant, or rights vested thereunder, but it is also unauthorized to alter or amend
them in such a way as will impair the contractual
relations or rights of the stockholders among
themselves, or between the corporation and its
stockholders; and it will also be seen that under
the reserved power the Legislature has only the
right to amend the charter, or laws with respect
thereto, which it would have had in the event it
had been decided in the Dartmouth College Case
that the federal Constitution did not apply to corporate charters. The Dartmouth College case did
not call in question nor involve any right or relation of the corporators among themselves. It involved only the relation of the corporation and the
state. Without the reservation it was held that
even such relation cannot be changed without
doing violence to the federal Constitution. Because of the reserved power the state many now
amend or alter the charter, so far as affecting the
contract with itself, and so long as it does not
change the fundamental character of the corporation or impair any vested rights acquired thereunder. But, as stated by the authorities, the right
is reserved for the benefit of the state and of the
public and for public purposes. The power can
only be exercised to the extent that the state is interested.''
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''Bearing in mind that the corporate charter
is a dual contract--one between the state and the
corporation and its stockholders, the other between the corporation and its stockholders--and
that under the reserved power the state may alter
or amend the former, but not the latter, the question is: Under which do the legislative enactment
of 19:~0 and the action taken by the majority of
the stockholders fall? We are of the opinion that
they do not pertain to any right, privilege, or immunity which the state had granted to the corporation or to its stockholders,and that the action by
such stockholders in no wise affected or was related to the contract existing between the state
and the corporation. It merely pertains to and
affech; the contract existing among the stockholders themselves.''
''In the original articles of incorporation each
Htockholder agreed, one with the other, that hiH
full-paid capital stock should be nonassesHahle.
'l'his proviHion might have been omitted or inserted as the corporatorH saw fit to agree among
themselves. Neither the state nor the publie were
eoncerned, whether they agreed upon one or the
other. No franchise or privilege granted by the
state to the defendant or its members was dependent upon this provision. The same grant, franchise, and privileges would have been granted had
the provision been omitted. Had it been omitted,
no other or greater liability would have been
created in favor of the creditors or the public
than was created by its insertion. Such a stipulation did not, then, in any wise pertain to the
contract between the state and the corporation.
It waH manifestly intended to concern and fix the
reciprocal rights of the stockholders among themHelves, and to place a limit upon the amount of
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money or capital that each was required to put
into the enterprise and contribute to the corporation. The whole consideration for the agreement
that no further contribution of capital to the
corporation should be exacted was the mutual
promise of the stockholders, the one to the other.
Neither the state nor the public had anything to
do with it, nor was either in any wise concerned
therewith. The corporators had the undoubted
right, as among themselves, to stipulate and
agree as to the extent of their contributions.''
f;inee a construction that the legislature intended by
use of the word "deemed" to raise a conclusive presumption that :-;tock in a water company could not be
appurtenant to land would be of doubtful constitutionality, the court should adopt the other construction, that
there is merely a presumption that it is not appurtenant. The legislature would not have the power, and common sen:-;e <lictates that the court not impute to the legislature the intent to sever water which was in fact appurtenant to the land. The stockholders in organizing
mutual companies elected to leave their water rights
appurtenant to their lands. rrhousands of mutual companies were organized all over the west. Courts from
every western state have held that the water in such
mutual companies is held by the stockholders as tenants
in common--that it is in most cases still appurtenant to
the land upon which used. No legislature could impair the
obligation of contract and defeat the stockholders intent
to have the water remain appurtenant.
1'he legislature was without authority to deprive
.John Edison Spencer of the water right conveyed to

112
him in 19i33 by both the certificate numbered 73 and the
deed. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 12). Such an
attempt would offend against Article One, Section 10
and the 5th and 14th Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 and 18 of
the Constitution of Utah. Tn this connection see also
deed to :f;Jlizabeth A. Tibbs copied into the transcript at
pages 35-61.

It is a well established rule of statutory construction
that if one possible construction would render a statute
of doubtful constitutionality and another equally logical
construction would leave the constitutionality of the
statute free from doubt, the courts should adopt the
latter construction. The legislature may constitutionally
raise a presumption that water represented by stock in a
corporation is not appurtenant. It could not as to companies already organized conclusively presume that the
water was not appurtenant to the land. The court should
therefore adopt the view that the language of the statute means at most only that it will be presumed that
water represented by stock is not appurtenant, but that
this presumption can be rebutted.
In this case the evidence is all to the effect that the
water right in dispute was at all times used on the land
owned by Spencer and his successors in interest, and
therefore the same was appurtenant to such lands.
It will also be noted that the amendment of 1943
does not have any retroactive effect. See U.C.A. 1943,
88-2-3. The certificates of stock here involved were all
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issued before the amendment of 1943. See also cases
cited in foot notes to U.C.A. 1943, 88-2-3.
''Certificates of stock, together with the
charter or articles of incorporation and the statute under which the corporation was organized
are evidence of a contract between the corporation
and the persons named therein or subsequent
holders thereof by proper assignment or transfer
and between the various stockholders, etc." 14
C. J. page 479, Sec. 699 and 18 C.J.S. page 723,
Sec. 258, subdivision, (b).
INDEPENDENT OF THE LAW AS TO APPURTENANCY OF \VATER TO LAND EDISON SP:BJNCF_jR
AND ELIZABFJTH A. 'riBBS OWN THE WATER
RJ1_j PRF}SENTED BY THE CERTIFICATES.
Of the 448 acres of water right decreed to Richard
H. Spencer there are now outstanding the following
certificates: No. 8G for 160 shares, 84 for 125 shares, 7:-l
for 80 shares, 72 for 80 shares and 3 acres of uncertifieated water right; total 448 acres or shares.
Under the evidence in this case there can be no
serious doubt about Edison Spencer being the owner of
certificates numbered 73 for 80 shares of stock and certificate numbered 86 for 160 shares of stock.
As to certificate numbered 73 it recites that Edison
Spencer is the pledgee. The evidence further shows that
it was delivered to Irwin M. Price as security for money
borrowed from Price by Richard H. Spencer. If and
when the loan was paid by Richard H. Spencer to Irwin
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M. Price the title to certificate numbered 73 which was
given by Edison to Price to secure his father's loan reverted to EJdison. Richard H. Spencer could not acquire
title to the certificate thus loaned to him to secure his obligation by the process of paying off the loan. There is
nothing in that certificate which even remotely shows
that Richard H. Spencer has any right, title or interest
therein. Price having disclaimed any interest in that
certificate the same belongs to Edison Spencer.
l\loreover in 1933 R. H. Spencer by warranty deed
conveyed 80 shares of water in Thistle Creek to John
Edison Spencer (See John Edison Spencer Exhibit 12).
That one may convey a certificate of stock by any writing not on the certificate itself is provided by U.C.A.
1943, 18-3-1 and 1943, 18-3-16.
What has been said about the ownership of certificate numbered 73 applies to certificate 86 for 160 shares
of stock. That certificate has been assigned to Edison
and the land upon which the same has been and is being
used has been conveyed to Edison who in consideration
of such transfer and conveyance assumed and paid off
the obligation that stood against the certificate and land
at the time the conveyance was made.
As to certificate 72 for 80 shares a slightly different
question is presented. The evidence shows that such
eertificate was during the course of this litigation for
the most part in the possession of counsel for Edison
Spencer, Richard H. Spencer and Irwin M. Price. A
futile attempt was made at the trial to show that Irwin
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M. Price had not employed counsel. We shall not enlarge
upon what we have already said with respect to the
affidavit of Price which, of course, was not competent
evidence, except to show that he did not claim any water
right.
As to certificate numbered 72 the evidence without
dispute shows that R. H. Spencer so far as he was able
to do gave the water represented by such certificate to
1\irs. Tibbs, not only by conveying to Mrs. Tibbs the
land upon which the water was used but by word of
mouth. He also gave Mrs. Tibbs a deed in which he
conveyed to her 20 shares of primary water right. The
deed is dated May 21, 1931. (Tr. 35). The evidence further shows that Richard H. Spencer was enjoined from
transferring any water right. It may well be that the
injunction in such particular was a nullity, but Richard
H. Spencer could not be expected to take the chance of
being punished for contempt if and when he made a formal transfer of the water. It is contended by plaintiff,
to which contention we do not agree, that Richard H.
Spencer did not claim such water right is conclusively
made evident by the fact that as late as 1944 he disclaimed any and all right to the water represented by
such certificate. If, as the plaintiff claims, Richard H.
Spencer solemnly disclaimed any and all interest in
eertificate numbered 72 in 1944 it is indeed difficult to
concieve of any law that would 'Permit the administrator
of his estate to successfully maintain a claim that he had
~mch

an interest. In this connection it will be recalled
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that there is a total absence of any evidence showing or
tending to show that Richard H. Spencer acquired any
right, title or interest in certificate numbered 72 and 73
since he filed his disclaimer in this action. The administrator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer having offered
in evidence the affidavit of Price to the effect that Price
relinquished aU right he had in certificates numbered
72and 73 in 1941 it follows that if R. H. Spencer did
make the disclaimer a.s contended for by the plaintiff
the administrator could not successfully set aside such
disclaimer. Therefore if, as appears, Price relinquished
his claim to certificates numbered 72 and 73 in 1941 and
if as plaintiff contends Richard H. Spencer disclaimed
any interest in certificates numbered 72 and 73 in 1944
and there is no evidence whatsover that Richard H.
Spencer has acquired any interest in certificates 72 and
73 since he made his alleged disclaimer in 1944 it necessarily follows that the ~dministrator of the estate of
Richard H. Spencer has completely failed to show any
title or interest in either certificates 72 or 73.
On the other hand the evidence shows without eonflict that Edison Spencer had an agreement with Irwin
M. Price in .July, 1946 just after the death of Richard H.
Spencer wherein and whereby Edison Spencer agreed to
carry on the litigation then pending in court to clear
up the title to such certificate to pay the costs of such
litigation and if successful to pay to Bonnie, the minor
daughter of

Irwin M. Price, the sum of $1000.00 and

transfer certificate 72 to his sister, Mrs. Tibbs, and that
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such arrangement had received the approval of Richard
H. Spencer prior to his death. That Edison Spencer is
carrying out his part of such agreement is obvious in
that he is prosecuting this action notwithstanding if he
is successful he will be out the expenses he is put to in
so doing and will not even if successful receive the water
right represented by certificate numbered 72.
Coming now to certificate numbered 84. The evidence shows that such certificate was delivered to Edison
Spencer by his father prior to his death; that Edison
took the certificate to Mr. Houtz, the secretary of the
Indianola Irrigation Company, to have the same transferred but the secretary refused to transfer the same.
There is language in the decree entered in case numbered
2888 which seems to enjoin Richard H. Spencer from
transferring any water rights. We doubt that the court
had jurisdiction to issue such injunction but it may be
that Richard H. Spencer hesitated to make any transfer
of such certificate or any certificate for fear that he
might be cited into court for contempt.
During the course of the trial counsel for the administrator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer attempted
to impeach the testimony of Mrs. Louise Spencer, the
wife of Edison, by reading to her some purported testimony given at the time of the hearing had on the petition
to appoint an administrator and on the hearing had in
the proceedings wherein it was sought to ascertain the
nature and amount of property owned by Richard H.
Spencer at the time of his death. In such former pro-
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ceeding Mrs. Spencer gave evidence touching the papers
that were delivered by Richard H. Spencer to his son
FJdison and Mrs. Tibbs after the same were received from
Mr. Beal. It was such papers that were apparently being
inquired about. The fact that Mrs. Spencer testified that
no other papers were then delivered may not be said to
detract from her testimony. She was not asked about any
water certificate; that she had in mind the deeds and
papers brought from Mr. Beal's office is made evident
by the fact that she did not mention the assignment of
the ear mark which assignment was executed at about
that time. Moreover the circumstances surrounding the
delivery of the deeds and the certificate for 125 shares
tends to corroborate the testimony of Edison Spencer
and his wife.
It is difficult to concieve of Mr. Spencer, the father,
transferring to his daughter and son the land which he
conveyed to them and then make such land worth only a
fractional part of what they are worth as irrigated
land by withholding the water right used thereon. Such
a transaction is contrary to all human experience. The
evidence shows that the land in question was of the probable value of $100.00 per acre with a water right and
from $10.00 to $20.00 without a water right. (Tr. 814 to
818 and 820 to 821) It is submitted that it is extremely
improbable that Richard H. Spencer intended any such
results on the eve of his passing away.
Moreover the record shows that Richard H. Spencer
had had considerable trouble and litigation touching his
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water rights. It is difficult to concieve of Mr. Spencer,
the elder, not making some provision of the manner in
which such water rights should be disposed of if and
when the same could be transferred. In this connection
the attention of the court is directed to U.C.A. 1943, 18-39 wherein it is provided:
''The delivery of a certificate by the person
appeming by the certificate to be the owner thereof without the indorsement requisite for the transfer of the certificate· and the shares represented
thereby but with intent to transfer such certificate or shares·shall impose an obligation, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, upon
the person so delivering to complete the transfe·r
by making the necessary indorsement. The transfer shall take effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made. This obligation may
be specifically enforced.''
Thus if, as the evidence shows, stock certificate No.
84 was delivered to Edison Spencer with the intention
that he should have the water represented thereby then
it follows that he is entitled to the water represented
thereby. See also in this connection U.C.A. 1943, 18-3-10.

If it be said that Edison disclaimed the right to
certificate numbered 73 in the disclaimer filed in 1944,
the same as did his father, it will be noted that at that
time the stock certificate appeared to be owned by Price;
that Price was willing to relinquish his claim thereto
only on condition that Edison pay to Bonnie, the daughter of Price, the sum of $1000.00 and deliver certificate
No. 72 to Mrs. Tibbs. It was after the disclaimer filed
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in 1944 that Edison made the agreement with Price. In
this connection the attention of the court is directed to
the testimony ·of Edison at the time of the hearing of
the petition for the appointment of an administrator and
the proceeding had for the discovery of the assets of the
estate. The fact should not be overlooked that Elizabeth
A. Tibbs kept house for her father for many years. (Tr.
879) and that John Edison Spencer, who was 42 years
of age at the time of the trial, had spent his matured
years in helping his father to acquire and save the property which he owned at the time of his death. (Tr. 597)
At the trial counsel for the administrator seemed to
place considerable stress on the evidence of Edison at
the time proceedings were had for the appointment of an
administrator to the effect that he claimed only some
three acres of uncertified water. Doubtless .BJdison had
in mind the water right to which he had the legal title.
Nothing could possibly be gained by I<Jdison representing
that he disclaimed the right to acquire the legal title to
the water right which he now claims. There could be no
conceivable reason for him to disclaim the right to pursue
his legal right to acquire the water right which he is here
seeking.
In conclusion it is the contention of Edison Spencer
and J1Jlizabeth A. Tibbs:
l.

tainity.

That the Hadlock mortgage

IS

void for uncer-
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2. rl'hat the decree of foreclosure is void for ambiguity and uncertainity in so far as it relates to 60
:-;hares or acres of water.
:~.

That the plaintiff herein may not, under the
guise of a suit to quiet title, in effect amend, modify or
render certain either the Hadlock mortgage or the decree
of foreclosure in case 2888 civil, because:
(a) The court is without power at this late date to
in effect modify, amend or render certain such decree.
(h) That the plaintiff not being a party to the
mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not be heard to
complain about its terms.
(c) That the only evidence permissible to ascertain
the meaning of the decree of foreclosure is the judgment
roll itself and such judgment roll is fatally defective in
that it does no.t disclose the subject matter of the foreclosure proceedings.
(d)

That there is no pleading in the Hadlock com-

plaint to foreclose on any particular shares or acres of
water right.
4.

That the deed made by Spencer and his wife to

the Indianola Irrigation Company is void for uncertainity.
5.

That in any event the decree entered in this cas·e

may not be affirmed because it awards to the plaintiff
and Hugentobler more wa:ter than they are entitled to
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and hy such decree all of the water rights in Thistle
Creek and it tributaries are clouded.
6. That the water right represented by the certificates of stock is appurtenant to the land upon which
such water right is ancl has been used, which lancl now is
ownecl by Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs.
7. 'l'hat even if it should be held, contrary to our
contention, that the water right represented by tho certificates is not appurtenant to the land EJdison Spencer
and Elizabeth A. 'l'ibhs are the equitable owners of such
certificates and entitled to have their titles thereto
quieted, provided, that .John Edison Spencer shall when
such title i:-; (iUieted, pay to Bonnie, the minor daughter
of Trwin l\L Price, the sum of $1000 and transfer certificate No. 72 to Elizabeth A. Tibbs.
8. '!'hat the administrator of the estate of Richard
H. Spencer has completely failed to establish any interest in any of the water right in question.
9. That the jndt,'lnent for costs awarded against
John ~1Jdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs should
he reversed.
10. That J1Jdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs
are entitled to a judgment. for their costs herein expended.

Respectfully submitted,
Elias Hansen
Attorney for Defendents and
a,ppellants, John Edison Spencer
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs

